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Abstract
Most bureaucracies today are rule-based. This is the result of a powerful intel-
lectual tradition that argues that allowing discretion in decision making could
lead to favoritism and collusion, with substantial costs to the organization. This
thesis draws on newly digitised data from one public sector bureaucracy, the
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) in Punjab, and presents novel evidence
on discretionary promotions and lateral job allocations of junior bureaucrats
by their seniors.
The first set of results show that when senior bureaucrats have discretion
to promote juniors, they do so meritocratically. By showing that promotions of
juniors by their seniors is meritocratic, the result challenges conventional ideas
on discretion in bureaucracies and opens the debate on rules vs. discretion.
A decadal analysis, of cohorts from 1980-2010, shows that discretionary
promotions became meritocratic starting in the 1990s.
The thesis then investigates the reasons behind meritocratic promotions by
seniors. It investigates two potential channels i.e. direct self-interest of the
senior through discretion in the choice of their team and reputation concerns
of seniors on referrals of juniors. Results show that direct self-interest of the
senior has a more important role to play in meritocratic promotions. However,
reputation concerns of seniors on referrals of juniors, might be a driver of the
change towards meritocracy starting in the 1990s.
The thesis next tests whether seniors use not just public information but
also their private information on juniors meritocratically. Results show that
seniors do use their private information to promote juniors meritocratically.
Seniors decipher not just hidden lemons from the stars but also hidden gems
from the bottom of the distribution.
The last part of the thesis studies lateral allocations of juniors by their
seniors. It draws on newly digitized administrative data on stated preferences
of junior bureaucrats for location of tax collection jobs. Based on this data,
the study creates four different types of job locations: non-competitive &
non-preferred by juniors; non-competitive & preferred; competitive & non-
preferred and competitive & preferred. Results show that lateral allocations
by seniors are meritocratic, so that high type are moved out of competitive
& non-preferred locations, while low type are moved out of competitive ones
that they prefer. However, an investigation into how different types of juniors
perform in tax collection in these locations, shows that this might not be the
most efficient allocation. Results show that in lateral allocations by seniors
there is a tension between meritocracy and efficiency. Taken together these
results have wider implications for how we think about the use of subjective
judgment in organizations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Fathers of modern bureaucracy envisaged an ideal system of administration
as one which was completely ‘dehumanized’ (Weber (1922), p.975; Northcote
et al. (1854)). Corruption, nepotism and arbitrariness resulting from the
exercise of discretion were seen as main impediments to an efficient admin-
istration. Later studies also highlighted how discretion could open the door to
favoritism or collusion and worsen the information environment (Tirole (1986);
Prendergast & Topel (1993); Prendergast & Topel (1996); Xu (2018)). This
powerful intellectual tradition has meant that when we look around us today,
most bureaucracies are rigid and follow fixed, rule-based decision making.
To avoid costs of patronage, it is almost taken for granted that bureaucracies
would have mechanical promotions through rules of seniority, fixed wages and
tenure at a job. But rule-based decision making is itself not cost-less. Consider
the case of fixed tenure based promotions. Promoting on the basis of fixed
rules can result in lowering of incentives (Bertrand et al. (2017)). It also means
discarding local, decentralized information that colleagues and supervisors
hold on the type and effort of workers. This begs the question: can discretion
result in meritocracy of allocation in bureaucracies? If it does, then this has
implications for our understanding of the rules versus discretion trade-off and
the use of subjectivity in decision making in organizations.
This thesis links long run careers of newly recruited bureaucrats to
increases in the discretion or power of their seniors and carries out four
main sets of analysis. First, I ask: are discretionary promotions meritocratic?
Promotions are meritocratic if with increases in power of seniors, high merit
new recruits are more likely to be promoted than low merit ones.
Second - which to the best of my knowledge has not been investigated
in the literature before - the study asks whether discretionary promotions
are meritocratic because it is in the self-interest of the senior to promote
meritocratically. More specifically, I test the existence and relative strength
of two possible mechanisms for meritocratic promotions by seniors i.e.
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discretion in the choice of their team and reputation concerns of seniors on
referrals of juniors to other teams. Investigating not just whether there are
meritocratic discretionary promotions, but also why there is meritocracy, helps
in understanding the specific conditions under which allowing discretion can
improve information in organizations.
The third set of analysis - which is unique to the thesis - tests whether
seniors use, not just public information, but their private information on
merit of juniors when exercising discretion. Observing a measure of merit
of juniors, which is just observed by seniors and the researcher, offers a unique
opportunity to study how information is used in a system with discretion. This
aims to shed light on the true value of allowing discretion.
The last set of analysis looks at another kind of discretionary allocations. It
investigates allocations by seniors of jobs that are similar in all aspects except
location and tests whether seniors allocate these heterogeneous lateral jobs
meritocratically. This analysis allows a first step towards an understanding of
the efficiency implications of a meritocratic system.
The data for this study is based on a large-scale data digitization effort.
I digitized and combined data from 5 different sources i.e. career charts
of 5 different groups of bureaucrats (i.e. Pakistan Administrative Services
(PAS), Provincial Civil Services (PCS), Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS),
Provincial Management Services (PMS), Ministerial Services); exam-rank data
of PAS bureaucrats; tax collection data across Punjab;1 incumbency board data
with details of vacancy and tenure of Assistant Commissioners (tax collector)
positions across Punjab; and preferences of juniors for location of Assistant
Commissioner (tax collector) jobs across Punjab (see appendix C for details).
The data used in the analysis is a subset of the bigger data-set that was
digitized. Outcomes are only studied for the Pakistan Administrative Services
(PAS) bureaucrats in Punjab, while other civil service groups are included
when classifying seniors of PAS. There are a couple of reasons for focusing
on PAS bureaucrats. PAS is an elite cadre of civil servants responsible for
running all key government departments at the federal and provincial level
as well as a number of public sector enterprises and companies. They are
responsible for the roll out of health programs, education programs, protection
of property rights and implementation of various UN and World Bank projects
etc. Therefore, understanding the allocation of talent within PAS can have
significant implications for understanding state effectiveness and welfare on
its own. A second reason is that I could only access exam rank data of
PAS bureaucrats. Since the study investigates meritocracy of discretionary
promotion, observing measures of merit, like exam rank, are important. A
1Pakistan is administratively divided into provinces, districts and tehsils. Punjab is the
wealthiest and largest province in terms of population
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third reason is the rule that is used to allocate PAS in their first jobs. This is the
rule that I exploit to get a source of variation in the set of seniors. However,
using this rule means that the set of data on which this study is based is
constrained. I observe data on first jobs for only a subset of PAS bureaucrats
(see figure 2.3 for details).
While promotions of juniors are considered throughout the long-run career
of juniors, the chapter investigating discretionary lateral allocations of juniors
restricts attention to just Assistant Commissioner (tax collector) jobs. These are
jobs that juniors perform at the start of their careers and for which job location
preference and tax performance data has been digitized. Preference data is
available for a subset of 13 cohorts of PAS civil servants between 1998-2015.
For consistency, the analysis in that chapter is carried out on cohorts that start
between 1998-2012.
To summarize, the analysis on discretionary promotions is based on a civil
servant-month panel data-set of Pakistan Administrative Services cohorts that
start between 1975-2012, that is a subset of the larger data digitized. While the
analysis of lateral allocations is based on a civil servant-month panel data set
from 1998-2012.
The core outcome that I use to study promotions is fast-track promotions.
Fast-track promotions allocate junior bureaucrats to higher positions ahead
of their stipulated time as per rules. These are at the discretion of senior
bureaucrats and the chief executive of the province. In fact, the higher the rank
of the senior, the higher the chance that they can exercise discretion over careers
of juniors. Fast-track are different from official promotions, that are based
on a bureaucrat’s experience, mandatory training and subjective performance
evaluation by their immediate bosses. These promotions are discretionary
only to the extent that they use subjective performance evaluation of bosses.
However, how the evaluation will be used to decide official promotions is
dictated by rules.
The outcomes I consider for the analysis of lateral allocations by seniors is
heterogeneity of a location in terms of both individual and average preferences
of juniors. Average preferences help shed light on the competitiveness of a
job location. The aim is to understand how competition for a location can
affect discretionary allocations of juniors to their preferred locations. It is
quite possible that discretion is more easily exercised in locations that are
individually preferred, but for which there is no aggregate preference. On
the other hand, discretion might be less important in positions that are highly
competitive. In order to understand these issues further, probability of juniors
working as Assistant Commissioners (tax collectors) in four different types
of locations are considered: non-competitive & non-preferred location; non-
competitive & preferred location; competitive & non-preferred location and
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competitive & preferred location. Competitiveness of a job location is the
index of competitiveness of the location that the junior works in. The index
of competitiveness is defined as the average preference for a location, i.e. total
demand for a location as a percentage of maximum demand for any location.
Working in preferred location is a dummy that turns on 1 if the junior is
working in a location that he or she stated as their preferred location.
The seniors considered are those that the PAS new recruits work with in
their first job. Attention is restricted to just the first set of seniors, as these are
the set of people with whom the juniors have the longest time together in the
organization. Moreover, just considering the first set of seniors also helps keep
causal identification tractable. This is because it helps in exploiting a rule of
initial allocation of juniors. It is worth emphasizing that the outcomes of the
juniors are studied, not those of the seniors. This helps overcome mechanical
correlations that have been discussed at length in the literature (Manski (1993),
Angrist (2014), Guryan et al. (2009), Caeyers & Fafchamps (2016)). I categorize
power of seniors (Power) as the average, over time, official promotions of
seniors that work with juniors in their first job.
There are two immediate challenges to a causal identification. First,
bureaucrats (both senior and junior) select into who they work with. Second,
in this context, how high the senior rises in the organizations depends on their
official promotions. This is determined by their subjective performance evalu-
ation and that could be correlated with unobservables of junior bureaucrats.
To address the first challenge, initial job allocation rules of the government
are exploited. The method of initial allocation is that new recruits can be
assigned jobs that are either vacant or where the incumbent has spent at least
one year on the job.2 This rule gives a set of potential positions that any cohort
of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats could have been allocated in their first job.
Potential seniors are classified as all the bureaucrats that are working in district
departments with a vacancy at the time of first job of newly recruited juniors.
The second challenge is addressed by using the Minimum Length of
Service Rules of the government to create rule-based measures of rise of the
potential seniors. Minimum Length of Service Rules stipulate that a bureaucrat
can be promoted once if they have completed five years in the government,
twice if they have completed twelve years, thrice if they have completed 17
years and four times if they have 22 years in the government.3 Using both the
initial allocation and promotion rules of the government, allows a classification
of a cohort-based, time varying measure: power of potential seniors (Powerp).
2cf. The Punjab Government Transfer Policy 1980; Inter-Provincial Transfers of DMG/PSP
Officers 1988; Government of Punjab Circular Letter 2004; Guidelines for Transfer of Assistant
Commissioners 2013. The idea behind this rule was to give some stability of tenure to existing
Assistant Commissioners.
3cf. Establishment Division’s O.M.No.1/9/80-R.2 dated 2-6-1983
19
It is defined as the average rule-based rank, of the first set of potential seniors,
of newly recruited cohorts of PAS bureaucrats.
To test meritocracy, the publicly observable measure of merit I use is a
ranking of juniors based on their recruitment exam. This is published in
newspapers (see appendix C for details). High (low) merit bureaucrats are
classified as those that are in the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the
recruitment exam.4 This measure is correlated with performance on the job.
Bureaucrats in the top 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam, collect
3% more taxes than bottom 90% and are 10% more likely to be awarded an
‘outstanding’ by their immediate bosses. When I consider those PAS that
work in the monitoring of schools, exam performance also positively predicts
educational outcomes like enrollment.
To define a measure of merit that is only privately observable to the seniors,
I use tax collection performance of PAS new recruits on their first job and
exploit a peculiar institutional feature which ensures that this performance is
only observed by the first set of seniors. Seniors at the fist job observe the
individual tax performance of juniors in meetings that all must attend. Tax
performance is reported to a central revenue agency i.e. Board of Revenue
(BOR) in a letter with annexes. This has the aggregate performance at the
top and individual tax collection by juniors as annexes. Clerks at the BOR
administratively handle these letters. They take the district level averages of
tax collection and share it with the organization, while tax performance of
juniors is dumped in gunny bags and thrown in record rooms (a glimpse
of the record keeping of BOR can be seen in in appendix B, figure B.3 and
online at: https://www.shanamanrana.com/research-in-the-field-a-snapshot).
This information on individual performance of juniors never makes it to their
formal files and never gets discussed. It remains private information of the set
of people that work in the district.5 High merit juniors are classified as those
that are in the top 10% of their cohort in tax collection (see appendix figure C.2
and table C.3 for details of data).6
Exam performance does not perfectly predict tax performance. A top 10%
exam performer has a 33% probability of being a top 10% tax collector, while
the bottom 10% exam performer still has a 14% chance of being a top10% tax
collector (see figure 5.1). This suggests that the seniors that are privy to the tax
4I also present results for top 5% to top 15% of exam performers and then top 20%, 30%,
40% and 50% (See appendix tables A.1 to A.4 and appendix tables A.5 till A.5).
5There can be many reasons why this information is not demanded by the organization.
One can be apathy and inefficiency, but a potential reason can be discretion accorded to the
senior most person in the district administration. Seniors are held responsible for performance
of the whole office, while they are allowed discretion to hold their teams responsible for
performance.
6I also present results for top 20% to top 50% of tax collectors.
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collection performance have local information on merit of the juniors that can
be exploited by the organization through discretion.
Results show that discretionary promotions of juniors by their seniors are
meritocratic. For every one rank above average increase in the power of the
potential seniors, the top 10% exam performer is 9% more likely to get fast-
tracked than the mid 80%. On the other hand, the bottom 10% exam performer
is 4% less likely to be fast tracked than the mid 80%. The effect for the top 10%
exam performers is both statistically and economically significant. It is one-
fifth the mean of fast-track promotions.
Results show that discretionary promotions have not always been merito-
cratic. I investigate heterogeneity of the effect across decades and find that,
for cohorts that started between 1981-1990, the bottom 10% exam performers
were 22% more likely to be fast-tracked than the mid 80%. However, this trend
reversed in the 1990s. With a rise in the power of the senior, cohorts that start
between 1991-2000, have a 38% higher probability than the base category to be
fast-tracked, while the bottom 10% have a 41% lower probability of being fast-
tracked. The differential effect at the top and bottom end of the distribution is
statistically significantly different from each other. This continues for cohorts
that start in the 2000s. For every one rank above average increase in the power
of the potential seniors, the bottom 10% exam performers in the 2000s cohorts
have a 69% lower probability of being fast-tracked than the base category, while
the top 10% and mid 80% have a positive probability. The differential effects
at the top and bottom are statistically significantly different from each other.
The reversal towards meritocracy of discretionary promotions opens up further
questions around the drivers of this change.
Next the study investigated the reason behind meritocracy. Results show
that with an increase in their power, the log of relative risk ratio is 1.5 times
lower for a bottom 10% exam performer to be pulled into the senior’s team and
promoted (relative to the base). This effect reverses for the top 10%. The effect
at the bottom is larger in magnitude than the top 10% and it is also statistically
significantly different from the top. Both these effects are larger for the senior’s
own team versus teams of others. Of the two competing mechanisms behind
meritocracy of promotions, it appears that discretion in choice of the team is a
more significant channel, rather than referrals to other teams.
I then investigate the decadal trends in these two mechanisms, to under-
stand whether (and which) of the two competing mechanisms can help shed
light on the move to meritocracy in the 1990s. There are two main takeaways.
First, in all decades tops 10% have a higher probability of being pulled into the
senior’s team and fast-tracked, while the bottom 10% have a lower probability.
Second, meritocratic referrals by seniors started in the 1990s. This change
mimics the move to meritocratic discretionary promotions starting in the 1990s.
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For the 1980s cohorts, with an increase in the power of seniors, bottom 10%
exam performers are more likely, than the base category, to move teams and be
fast-track promoted. This effect reverses for the cohorts that start in the 1990s
and 2000s. Results of the decadal analysis are consistent with the idea that it
was a change in reputation concerns of seniors that might be a driver of the
change towards meritocracy starting in the 1990s. What triggered this change
is an exciting agenda for future research.
This study then investigates whether seniors use their private information
on juniors meritocratically. Results show that with increases in the power
of potential seniors, those top 10% exam performers that are not top 10%
tax collectors are 50% less likely to be fast-tracked than those that are star
performers in both dimensions. The effects are statistically significantly
different across the two categories of performance. These results are also
economically significant, with the difference between the two being 1.5 times
the mean of fast-track promotions. More importantly, with a one rank above
average increase in the power of potential seniors, those bottom 10% exam
performers who are in the top 10% of tax collectors, have a two times
higher probability of being fast-tracked than those who are bottom in both
dimensions. Again, the two effects are statistically significantly different from
each other. Taken together these results suggest that seniors are not just able
to decipher hidden lemons from the true stars but also hidden gems from the
bottom of the distribution. This sheds light on the true value of discretion in
organizations.
The fourth set of results on lateral allocations show that with an increase
in their power, seniors are more likely to move top 10% exam performers
out of competitive jobs that they do not prefer. On the other hand, they
are less likely to allocate preferred and competitive jobs to bottom 10% exam
performers. These results are in line with the results on promotions. Seniors
allocate heterogeneous lateral jobs meritocratically and use their power to
accommodate the high types. However, further investigations show that this
might not be the most efficient allocation. Descriptive evidence on the tax
performance of different types of juniors in these heterogeneous locations,
suggests that a system that supports the bottom 10% exam performers is
more likely to improve performance. Bottom 10% exam performers perform
relatively better in jobs that are preferred by them and for which there is very
little outside competition. On the other hand, bottom 10% exam performers
perform the worst in jobs that are competitive but which they do not prefer.
Therefore, if anybody has to be moved out of such job locations it should be the
bottom 10% exam performers rather than the top 10%. These results highlight
the tension between meritocracy and efficiency. This trade-off might be more
prominent for public sector organizations where workers have job security for
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life and there is limited exit of workers. Results suggest that in such a system
preferences of low types also need to be given due consideration.
To the best of my knowledge this is the first analysis that empirically
investigates meritocracy of discretionary promotions using both publicly and
privately observable measures of merit, with a potential explanation for why
there can be meritocracy. These results challenge: (a) the conventional view
of bureaucracies being ossified establishments; and (b) the Weberian ideal of
a bureaucracy that is best when stripped of all subjectivity (Weber (1922)).
It appears that a case can be made to increase autonomy in bureaucracies
rather than reducing it. Moreover, since not just public sector bureaucracies
bring together the labor of multiple workers, the potential for using local
information through discretion has broader implications even for private sector
and non-governmental organizations. It is also the first to investigate the role of
discretion of seniors in the allocation of competitive-preferred jobs to juniors,
in a public sector bureaucracy and highlight a tension between meritocracy
and efficiency.
The thesis contributes to a growing body of evidence on the value of
discretion for performance in public sector bureaucracies. In Nigeria, Rasul
& Rogger (2017) find that increasing bureaucrats’ autonomy is positively
associated with project completion rates. In Italy, Bandiera et al. (2009) find
that more autonomous public bodies have less passive waste from regulatory
burden and the same level of corruption. In India, Duflo et al. (2018)
show that discretionary inspections by an environmental regulator cause three
times more pollution abatement than would the same number of randomly-
assigned inspections. This thesis contributes to this literature by studying
the meritocratic effects of discretion in promotions and highlighting the
mechanism through which meritocracy operates.
The thesis adds to the rapidly expanding literature on the organizational
economics of the state. Dal Bo´ et al. (2013) and Ashraf et al. (2018) study
recruitment of public sector workers. There have been many studies that focus
on understanding the incentives of these workers (Iyer & Mani (2012); Banerjee
et al. (2012); Ashraf et al. (2014); Bertrand et al. (2017); Khan et al. (2016); Khan
et al. (2018); Xu (2018); Callen et al. (2013); Finan et al. (2015)). This thesis
holds selection constant and studies the allocation of talent through discretion
of seniors. The two papers that follow this line of inquiry and investigate
promotions in large bureaucracies are Xu (2018) and Jia et al. (2015): Xu (2018)
studies how discretion affected the promotion and incentives of governors in
the British colonial administration from 1854-1966 and finds that discretion
has a high cost to the organization. On the other hand, Jia et al. (2015) study
the promotions of Chinese state officials and find that networks can help the
organization promote the best performers. Results in this thesis complement
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these two studies by first considering a different agent exercising discretion on
promotions i.e. existing workplace seniors and then highlighting the incentives
of the person exercising discretion as an important part of the relationship. The
more closely aligned are the incentives of the person exercising discretion to
those of the organization, the higher the chance of meritocratic allocations.
Moreover, this thesis also sheds light on the use of private information under
discretion and investigates lateral allocations as well as promotions.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the context
and data. Chapters 3 asks whether promotions within this bureaucracy
are meritocratic. It starts off with an analysis of promotions on average.
This is then followed by analysis of whether seniors use their discretion to
promote meritocratically. The last part of the chapter carries out a decadal
analysis of cohorts to understand whether discretionary promotions have
always been meritocratic. Chapter 4 investigates the mechanism behind
meritocracy of discretionary promotions and concludes with a decadal analysis
of the mechanism. This is to help understand reasons for the different
trends in meritocratic promotions by seniors. Chapter 5 investigates whether
seniors use not just public, but their private information meritocratically.
Chapter 6 moves away from promotions and investigates discretionary lateral
allocations of juniors. This starts off with a discussion of the data and presents
key descriptives. The chapter then tests allocations on average. This is
followed by an investigation of the performance of different types of juniors
in heterogeneous job locations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
allocations by seniors and its implications. Chapter 7 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Background and Data
2.1 Background
2.1.1 The Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS)
The focus of this study is on Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) bureau-
crats that work in Punjab, Pakistan. Figure 2.1 shows the map of Pakistan with
Punjab highlighted in orange. Punjab is the largest province in Pakistan in
terms of population. It has a total population that is nearly one-third of the
population in the US (110 million people, 55% of total population in Pakistan).
Figure 2.1: Map of Pakistan. The province of Punjab is marked in orange. PAS
bureaucrats working in the province of Punjab are the focus of study.
The Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS), a successor of the erstwhile
Indian Civil Service (ICS), is an elite group of federal civil servants. They
run all key government departments at the federal and provincial level. The
most senior civil service positions - the Secretary of Cabinet at the federal and
provincial levels, the Chief Secretary of all the four provinces, heads of most
provincial and federal government departments - are in general occupied by
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PAS officers. PAS civil servants are responsible for designing health, education
and taxation policy of the government as well as implementing various key
projects of the government and international financial institutions like the
World Bank and United Nations. They also occupy key positions in public
sector enterprises, autonomous bodies and state-run companies.
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) recruitment is through a com-
petitive exam conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC).
PAS bureaucrats start their career in rank 17 and can get promoted all the
way to rank 22.1 Figure 2.2 presents the time-line of the initial career of
a PAS new recruit. On recruitment, PAS civil servants undergo 18 months
of academic training which is followed by 6 months of on-the-job training.2
Training is centrally administrated by the Civil Services Academy as well as
the Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) Academy. The length of training
and the dates of start and end of training are determined centrally by these
training institutions, under the guidance of the federal government.
month = 0 month = 18 month = 24
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2. where
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Figure 2.2: Timeline of the initial career of PAS new recruits
After 24 months of training, new recruits are allocated their first job.
The job allocation process works in the following way: on recruitment,
civil servants become part of a central pool of bureaucrats. On the other
hand, there is a pool of jobs that are rank and department specific. The
role of the human resource department is to match a bureaucrat to a job.
Officially, the role of human resources is carried out by the chief executive
1Throughout for the purpose of the analysis I normalize these ranks as 0-5.
2This has historically ranged from 18 weeks to 37 weeks.
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of the province (Chief Minister (CM)) and senior civil servants in the Services
and General Administration Department (S&GAD) and the Chief Minister’s
Secretariat. Although, the job allocation process in this setting is theoretically
very centralized, in practice there are negotiations behind the scene so that
bureaucrats do select into jobs. In general, new job creation is not easy and has
to be ratified by multiple committees. The total number of jobs are determined
by the government through pre-specified rules.
77% of PAS new recruits start their first job as Assistant Commissioners
(AC), in one of the 36 district departments in Punjab, where they mainly collect
taxes.3 How the initial allocation of bureaucrats is carried out is implied by the
Tenure/Transfer Policy of the government. Following this policy, new recruits
can only be allocated jobs that are vacant or where the incumbent bureaucrat
has spent at least 1 year.4 This is the policy that I exploit to get variation in the
first set of seniors.
There are two kinds of promotions in this setting, official promotions
and fast-track promotions. Official promotions are based on experience,
training and subjective performance evaluation of the bureaucrats by their
immediate bosses. Discretion can be exercised in this case through subjective
performance evaluation by bosses, however, how these evaluations will be used
in determining official promotions is determined by rules. On the other hand,
fast-track promotions are when higher ranked jobs are allocated to junior civil
servants, ahead of their stipulated time. These are at the discretion of the chief
executive of the province and senior civil servants. The context is such that
the higher the likelihood that he or she will have discretion over fast-track
promotions of juniors.
2.2 Data
Cohorts of PAS bureaucrats are recruited together. However, not all of them
start their on-the-job training together.5 Since I classify seniors at the end of
on-the-job training and at the start of the first job, I define cohorts as those
3As per Inter-provincial Transfers of DMG/PSP Officers, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet
Secretariat, Establishment Division, 10th April, 1988, (5/9/86-E.5) PAS civil servants are meant
to work as an Assistant Commissioners (AC) at the very start of their career
4cf.The Punjab Government Transfer Policy 1980; Inter-Provincial Transfers of DMG/PSP
Officers 1988; Government of Punjab Circular Letter 2004; Guidelines for Transfer of Assistant
Commissioners 2013.
5There can be many reasons for this. One such reason is that some new recruits have
retaken the competitive exam and so move to Pakistan Administrative Services from other civil
service groups. These civil servants called ‘repeaters’ in civil service parlance have sometimes
partially completed the civil service academic training and so start their on-the-job training
sooner than the rest of the PAS bureaucrats that they are recruited with.
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bureaucrats that start their training together. This is the definition of cohort
used throughout the main analysis.6
Figure 2.3 shows the number of bureaucrats in each cohort, in the data,
that started training together from 1962-2015. There are 77 cohorts and 646
bureaucrats that have any information on their cohort. The average number of
bureaucrats per cohort in this larger sample is 8.
The analysis of discretionary promotions is restricted to cohorts that train
between 1975-2012. Cohorts that start training in 1975 are the first ones on
whom exam rank data becomes available. Having this data is important to
test meritocracy of promotions. I restricted the cohorts to 2012 so that I can
observe the career of the last cohorts for a few years. Between 1975-2012, the
cohorts used in the analysis are 39, with an average size of 5 bureaucrats per
cohort. These are also those cohorts that worked as Assistant Commissioners
in their first job. Below, in the career charts data section, I will discuss why
this is important.
Tax performance data is more limited owing to the standard of record
keeping of the Central Revenue Agency. The analysis in chapter 5 is carried
out for 91 PAS bureaucrats, across 29 cohorts. These are cohorts that started
between 1985-2012. The average size of these cohorts is 3 bureaucrat per cohort.
The data for the study is based on a large-scale digitization effort. I
combined data from five different sources to create a civil servant-month panel
data-set. In the following sections in this chapter, four different data-sets that
were digitized for the first time are described. In chapter 6, I describe the
data on stated preferences of bureaucrats that are relevant for the analysis of
discretionary lateral allocations.
Career charts data: For this study career charts of five different groups
of civil servants were digitized for the first time i.e. Pakistan Administrative
Services (PAS), Provincial Civil Services (PCS), Provincial Secretariat Services
(PSS), Provincial Management Services (PMS), Ministerial Services. This
resulted in an unbalanced panel of civil servant - month from 1950-2015 (see
appendix figure B.1 for a copy of the career chart and figure C.1 and appendix
table C.1 for details of number of bureaucrats per civil service group and time
periods when they are observed).
The total number of bureaucrats in the data are 1982 of which 785 are
PAS, 468 are directly recruited PCS, 308 are those PCS bureaucrats that have
been recruited at a lower grade and have risen through the ranks to PCS (also
known as ‘promotees’ or ‘rankers’ in civil services), 77 are PSS, 289 are directly
recruited PMS, 9 PMS who have risen through the ranks but were recruited at
6This is the definition on which I redefine exam rank, classify tax performance and on
which all error terms are clustered and fixed effects are defined.
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Figure 2.3: This figure shows the data-set on Pakistan Administrative Services
(PAS) bureaucrats that was digitized and the data used in the analysis (see
appendix C for details).
a lower rank and 27 are Ministerial Staff. For 19 of these bureaucrats, data on
the group that they belong to is missing. The source of the career charts data
is Services and General Administration Department (S&GAD).
In this thesis outcomes are only studied for the Pakistan Administrative
Services (PAS) bureaucrats, however, other civil service groups are included
when classifying seniors of these PAS bureaucrats. There are a couple
of reasons to restrict attention to this group. First, as discussed, it is
an important bureaucracy to study. For historical reasons and despite
resentment from other groups (Sahi (2018)), PAS has been an elite cadre of
civil services. Bureaucrats belonging to this group occupy key policy making
and implementation positions in a variety of departments. PAS is much like
the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) - with whom it shares its ancestry -
which despite its limited size, has the power to impact regional GDP in India
(Bertrand et al. (2017)).
Second, exam rank data, which is important for understanding the
meritocracy of allocations, is only available for this group of civil servants.
Third, only PAS bureaucrats have a rule governing the job that they are
meant to do at the start of their career. On the other hand, there is no rule
governing the allocation of the other groups of civil services at any point in
29
their careers.7 This has important implications for the definition of potential
seniors (see subsection 3.2.2 for details). The rule for PAS is that they have to
be allocated Assistant Commissioner positions.8 Out of 785 PAS officers, I have
information on the first job of 414. 317 out of 414 PAS were allocated Assistant
Commissioner position in their first job (77%).
Exam rank data: The exam rank data has been digitized for the first
time from hard copy of the records of the Federal Public Service Commission
(FPSC). While the career charts data is for PAS bureaucrats that work in Punjab,
the exam rank data from FPSC data is on all PAS recruited, irrespective of
where they work. The exam rank data has the name and the year that the
bureaucrat took the recruitment exam for 1033 PAS bureaucrats that train
between 1973-2015.
99 PAS bureaucrats in career charts data are armed forces inductees. They
do not have exam rank data. I exclude them from the analysis.9 Out of those
left and those who had information on their cohorts, I was able to match the
career charts and exam rank data of 482.10 The overlap of exam rank and
those with information on first Assistant Commissioner (AC) job, results in
204 PAS bureaucrats, across 39 cohorts between 1975-2012, that are the basis
of this study. (see appendix table C.2 for details of the number of bureaucrats
on whom data is available and those that were matched with career charts
data and figure 2.3 for details of the larger data-set and the data on which the
analysis of the paper is based).
Tax collection data: Tax collection data was acquired from the central
revenue agency i.e. the Board of Revenue (BOR) and digitized for the first
time. The tax considered is Agricultural Income Tax (AIT)/Land Revenue,
levied on rural areas and collected at each village and revenue circle level, by
a team of revenue officers i.e. patwari, naib-tehsildar and tehsildar, that work
7The PSS and ministerial group can be allocated any position across the civil secretariat in
the capital, while PCS and PMS bureaucrats can be allocated any position be it in the secretariat
or otherwise across Punjab.
8Inter-provincial Transfers of DMG/PSP Officers, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet
Secretariat, Establishment Division, 10th April, 1988, (5/9/86-E.5)
9There is a 10% quota for people from the armed services in civil services of Pakistan.
Government policy is that these new recruits from the armed forces are arbitrarily awarded
the same exam rank as the top person that enters the system through the competitive exam.
They do not undertake the competitive exam and so exam rank data on them is not available.
I therefore, exclude these bureaucrats from the analysis.
10It was not possible to match bureaucrats across the two data if the way the name
was written differed across the two records eg. ‘Muhammad Mehmood’ vs. ‘Mohamad
Mahmood’ and there was no cohort or other information to verify or if the recruitment
exam cohort information is missing or if the person re-rook the recruitment exam multiple
times so that the career charts data had one cohort and the FPSC data had another. I used
archives of newspapers, interviewed various civil servants and used various online forums
(like http://www.cssforum.com.pk) to confirm cohort details, match the exam rank and career
charts data and double check any missing information.
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under the PAS Assistant Commissioners.11 The BOR sets annual tax collection
targets, based on farm size. Against these targets, Assistant Commissioners
are responsible for the tax collection of the whole tehsil.
The tax collection data is an unbalanced, monthly panel of revenue circles
from 1983-2013.12 940 revenue circles are observed in 137 different tehsils, of 36
different districts, across Punjab (see appendix figure C.2 for details of revenue
circles observed across each tehsil. Appendix table C.3 describes details of the
years for which each tehsil is observed and the total number of revenue circles
per tehsil that are observed in the tax collection data).
To create a measure of tax performance of each junior officer from the
revenue circle-month observations, I created tehsil-month averages of tax
collected as a percentage of tax target. This tehsil-month panel of tax collected
was then combined with the career charts data for those bureaucrats that
worked as an Assistant Commissioner, in a tehsil, in a given month. This
gives me a panel of tax performance of civil servants from 1983-2013.
There are 654 bureaucrats across civil service groups on whom I have
tax performance data. Of these 241 are PAS. For 115 of these I have tax
performance on their first job. However, only 91 PAS bureaucrats, across 29
cohorts also have exam rank data and are not military inductees. The analysis
in chapter 5 is carried out on these bureaucrats between 1985-2012.
Incumbency board data: In order to classify the set of potential seniors
of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats, we need to observe the vacancy position
and tenure of all Assistant Commissioner positions across Punjab. This study,
therefore, digitized for the first time, data from incumbency boards of Assistant
Commissioner (AC) offices across Punjab. Figure B.6 shows an example of an
incumbency board. Each incumbency board has the name of the bureaucrat
and the dates when he or she held the job. From here a daily panel of vacancy
and tenure of Assistant Commissioner positions across Punjab was created.
This data was combined with the career charts data on date of end of on-the-job
training of PAS new recruits, to define the set of potential seniors. Appendix
table C.4 describes details of the data that was digitized on incumbency boards.
It shows the name of the tehsil and the total years when the position is
observed. Incumbency boards are a tradition from colonial times. It is a status
symbol for the civil servant and every new civil servant takes pride in ensuring
his/her name is up on the board with the dates of their tenure. Therefore, the
data is reliable.
11A revenue circle is a collection of a few villages. Pakistan is divided into Provinces,
district, tehsil and then union councils. Revenue circles are a smaller unit than union councils.
12Some revenue circles in Okara and Depalpur tehsil are observed since 1983 and others
in Hazro, Attock observed since 2001. The attrition in the data is random and is a result of
poor record keeping of the BOR (a glimpse of the record keeping of BOR can be seen in in
appendix B, figure B.3 and online at: https://www.shanamanrana.com/research-in-the-field-
a-snapshot).
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Key variables and descriptive statistics
Power of seniors (Power). Seniors are defined as everybody that a newly
recruited PAS bureaucrat worked with, in the first month, of the first job. These
set of first seniors remain fixed. The organization is such that the higher the
senior, the more power they exercise over careers of juniors. Therefore, in each
time period, power of seniors is defined as average official rank of first seniors.
It is classified as:
Power o f seniors (Power) = ∑
S
s=1 Of f icial rank o f seniorss
S
(2.1)
where official rank is the rank of the senior based on their official
promotions and S is the number of first seniors that are still in Punjab in that
time period.13 For consistency and to keep the results comparable across OLS
and reduced form, I create cohort-month level averages of power of seniors.14
The source for the variable is career charts data. These records allow
a classification of who works with whom, when and where and official
promotion of each bureaucrat. From there it is possible to build adjacency
matrix of the first seniors of juniors and combine these with their official
promotions to quantify power of seniors. An added advantage of using career
charts to identify seniors is that I can objectively classify the set of first seniors.
This helps overcome measurement error and subjectivity bias that is common
in network surveys and that has been highlighted in the literature (Jackson
(2013)). Figure 2.4 shows the variation in power of seniors across cohorts. The
red dotted line is the mean which is 1.1.
Fast-track and official promotions of juniors. Fast-track promotions are
quantified as a dummy that turns on 1 whenever actual rank of a junior
bureaucrat is higher than their official rank.
Fast− track promotion = 1{Actual rank − o f f icial rank o f junior>0} (2.2)
On the other hand, official promotions are quantified as a dummy that
turns on one whenever the civil servant is officially promoted from one rank
to the next.
Of f icial promotion = 1{Junior o f f icially promoted} (2.3)
13Official promotions move bureaucrats from rank 17-22. I normalize them from 0-5, 0 being
the junior most rank and 5 being the most senior.
14While first seniors are defined at an individual junior bureaucrat level, exogenous
variation in power of first senior comes from potential seniors, defined at a cohort level.
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Figure 2.4: Variation in power of seniors across cohorts
The source of both these variables is the career charts of bureaucrats (see
figure B.1). From there one can observe the date of official promotion of
a bureaucrat. To classify fast-track promotions, information is used on the
various jobs that bureaucrats are allocated. From the career charts data I
can observe the job that civil servants are doing. To classify the rank of the
job, notifications of job ranks by the Services and General Administration
Department (S&GAD) are used. These were personally acquired from S&GAD.
Rank of the job was manually assigned after going through the notifications.
Whenever the actual rank of the job that the bureaucrat occupies is higher than
his or her official rank, the bureaucrat is classified as being fast-track promoted.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 plot the actual and official careers of a sample of cohorts
from the 70s, 80s, 90s and 2000s. The red dotted line is the mean rank based
on official promotion of a cohort. The blue dotted line is the mean rank based
on fast-track promotions. Once a civil servant is officially promoted he or
she can’t be demoted. However, that is not the case for fast-track promotions.
These are at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive
of the province. Being fast-tracked does not confer a right and so fast-tracked
bureaucrats can be demoted as well.
Table 2.1 shows that there is more variation in fast-track promotion than
official promotion. The mean official promotion of a civil servant in a month
is 1%, while the probability of fast-track promotion in a month is 27%. Across
the 39 cohorts that are used in the study and the full sample of 77 cohorts, the
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max person x month
Exam rank sample: 39 cohorts
Power of seniors (Power) 1.08 0.94 0 5 23202
Power of potential seniors (Powerp) 2.08 0.94 0 4 23395
Career Progression
Official promotions 0.01 0.11 0 1 23618
Fast-track promotions 0.27 0.44 0 1 20328
Teams
Working in seniors’ team 0.17 0.38 0 1 15486
Full sample: 77 cohorts
Official promotions 0.01 0.11 0 1 96881
Fast-track promotions 0.27 0.44 0 1 81306
Teams
Working in seniors’ team 0.25 0.43 0 1 26971
Note: Power of seniors (Power) is the average seniority of first seniors of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats that they work
with in the first month of the first job. It is measured as the average official promotions, over time, of the set of seniors.
Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based seniority, over time, of the first set of potential seniors that
junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Official promotions are promotions that are based on
experience, training and subjective performance evaluation of the bureaucrat by the immediate bosses. It is defined as
a dummy that turns on one whenever the bureaucrat is officially promoted to the next rank, zero otherwise. Fast-track
promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined
as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank.
Working in seniors team is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the juniors are working in the team of their
first seniors in the long run (after their first interaction at the first job).
mean values of official and fast-track promotion remains the same, suggest-
ing that the sample used in the study is representative. Figure 2.7 shows the
variation in fast-track promotion across different cohorts. The red dotted line
is the mean, which is 0.27. An average PAS junior stays fast-tracked one-third
of their total career.
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Figure 2.5: Actual vs. official rank: The blue line is the actual rank of a cohort
while the red line is their official rank.
Junior working in team of first seniors (long-run, second job onward).
Seniors are determined in the first month of the first job. Once the seniors are
determined, first job is excluded from the analysis and the long-run career of
the juniors and seniors together is used for investigation in the study. Working
in team of first seniors is classified as a dummy that turns on 1 whenever
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Figure 2.6: Actual vs. official rank: The blue line is the actual rank of a cohort
while the red line is their official rank.
the juniors and their first seniors end up systematically working together in a
given month, in their long-run careers.
Junior working in team o f senior = 1{Junior in team o f senior (2nd job on)} (2.4)
The source of this variable is career charts of bureaucrats from Services &
General Administration Department (S&GAD) which allows to observe where
each person worked and when. Table 2.1 shows that in the long run, in the
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Figure 2.7: Fast-track promotion of juniors across cohorts. Red dotted line is
the mean of fast-track promotions (0.27).
sample of 39 cohorts, the mean probability of a junior working in the team of
any of their first seniors is 17%. On average nearly one-fifth of the junior’s
career is spent in the team of the seniors they met in the first job. This
probability is 25% in the sample of 77 cohorts.
Publicly observable measure of merit of junior: Recruitment exam ranking.
The first measure of merit I use is ranking of juniors based on their recruitment
exam. This ranking is published in the national newspapers. The source of this
variable is Federal Public Service Commission. I define publicly observable
measure of merit of the junior as:
Exam top (bottom) 10% = 1{Junior in top (bottom) 10% o f cohort in recruitment exam}
(2.5)
Exam top (bottom) 10% junior bureaucrats are quantified as a dummy
that turns on 1 whenever a junior is in the top (bottom) 10% of a cohort
in the recruitment exam. Appendix tables A.1 to A.4 show that results are
robust to defining high-low merit as top-bottom 5%, 6%, 7%, all the way till
top-bottom 14%. In a month there are 29% positions that are filled by fast-
tracking junior bureaucrats. Since in this bureaucracy, the proportion of posts
filled through fast-tracking juniors is small, one would expect that the effect
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of senior’s discretion can only materialize for a small proportion of juniors.
This is what is seen. Appendix tables A.5 till A.5 show that, as expected, the
effect just materializes for a small proportion of the exam distribution. Seniors
exercise their discretion meritocratically and only push the very top juniors for
promotions.
Recruitment exam ranking is a measure of merit that is positively corre-
lated with measures of performance on the job. As discussed, the top 10% in
recruitment exam collect 3% more taxes than the bottom 90% and are 10% more
likely to be awarded ‘outstanding’ in subjective evaluations by their bosses.
Privately observable measure of merit of junior: Tax collection. To quantify
a measure of merit that is privately observable to the seniors, tax performance
of the new recruits in their first job as Assistant Commissioners is used. The
source of this variable is the historical tax records of the Board of Revenue.
As described, the BOR sets annual tax collection targets based on official
record of farm sizes and number of farmlands of the area (see table A.12 and
A.13 where I test for this and find that that is indeed the case). In weekly
meetings with other district officials i.e. first seniors, each new recruit working
as an Assistant Commissioner (AC) reports back how much they collected
against the annual target.
Since they work with the juniors, the first seniors are privy to their tax
performance as they work together. However, once the tax performance has
been discussed at the district department level, this is reported to the BOR
through a letter. This letter has an aggregate tax collected by the district
department and the tax performance of juniors, attached only as an annex.
These are administratively handled at the BOR by the clerical staff. The clerks
only use the district averages and share them with the officials at the BOR.
The individual performance of the juniors never makes it to official decision
making levels and never reaches the junior’s individual personnel record
files. There is neither knowledge of these records, nor a demand for them
at the higher tiers. This was confirmed in multiple meetings with different
officials in the Board of Revenue (BOR) and Services & General Administration
Department (S&GAD). Tax performance is defined as:
Tax top 10% = 1{Junior in top 10% o f cohort in tax per f ormance} (2.6)
It is a dummy that turns on 1 whenever a new recruit is in the top 10% of
the cohort in tax collection against the BOR target. I also report results using
38
top 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% to understand whether the effect varies across the
tax collection distribution.
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Chapter 3
Are promotions meritocratic?
3.1 Are promotions meritocratic on average?
As a simple first step, this study tests the heterogeneity of fast-track pro-
motions based on exam and tax performance. I estimate the following OLS
regression:
Fast− trackict = pi + αAic + βAic + eict (3.1)
where Aic ∈ {Exam top 10%, Tax top 10%} of junior i in cohort c and Aic ∈
{Exam bottom 10%, Tax bottom 10%} of junior i in cohort c. Fast− trackict is the
probability that a junior i, in cohort c, in month-year t, is fast-track promoted.
eict is the error term that is clustered at the cohort level.
Results are shown in Table 3.1. While results suggest meritocracy of
promotions on average, the evidence is weak. Top 10% exam performer having
a 4% higher probability of being fast-tracked and bottom 10% exam performers
having a 6% lower probability, than mid 80% exam performers, respectively.
However, these differential effects are not statistically significantly. An F-test
of α = β has a p-value of 0.06, suggesting that the top and bottom end of the
exam distribution, does enjoy a different career trajectory, on average.
The differential effects are more imprecise and also insignificant, in the case
of tax performance. It is also not possible to reject similarity of the effect at the
top and bottom end of the tax distribution. In the case of tax performance, the
p-value of an F-test of α = β is 0.23.
Figure 3.1 plots the length of career that bureaucrats in the top 10%, mid
80% and bottom 10% remain fast-tracked, while figure 3.2 shows the per month
share of juniors of different exam rank that are fast-tracked.
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Table 3.1: Overall are fast-track promotions meritocratic?
Dependent variable:
Fast-track
promotions
(1) (2)
Exam Top 10% (α) 0.04
(0.04)
Exam Bottom 10% (β) -0.06
(0.05)
Tax Top 10% (α) 0.07
(0.09)
Tax Bottom 10% (β) -0.03
(0.07)
Constant 0.31*** 0.33***
(0.03) (0.05)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.06 0.23
Controls No No
Cohort & time FE No No
Mean 0.30 0.35
person x mon 17864 5711
Cohorts 39 29
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior
civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank
of the civil servant is higher than his or her official rank. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those
bureaucrats that are in the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. The omitted category is mid 80%
exam performers. Tax performance is from the first Assistant Commissioner (AC) job of a newly recruited bureaucrat.
Tax top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top (bottom) 10% of the cohort in tax
collection. The omitted category is mid 80% tax collection.
In both these cases we can see that fast-track promotions appear to
be meritocratic on average, with the high types enjoying more fast-track
promotions than the low types. However, results from table 3.1 suggest these
effects are significantly different only across the top 10% and bottom 10% exam
performers. Figure 3.3 does a similar exercise but for tax performance. In this
case it is not possible to reject similarity of the effect even across the top and
bottom 10%.
Overall, it appears that there is very weak evidence of meritocratic fast-
track promotions on average. However, underneath this weak average effect
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Figure 3.1: The figure shows the average length of career different exam
performing juniors remain fast-tracked
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Figure 3.2: The figure shows the share of different exam performing juniors
that are fast tracked per month
lies heterogeneity according to discretion of the seniors. I explore this further
in the next subsection.
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3.2 Are promotions meritocratic when seniors have
discretion?
This part of the thesis explores whether fast-track promotions of junior workers
are meritocratic when their first seniors have more discretion over their
career. Table 3.2 presents results from a pooled difference-in-difference. For
exposition, just for these results, power of seniors is classified as a dummy.
Above (below) median power of seniors is a dummy that turns on 1 whenever
the power of first seniors is above (below) median for a year. The cells contain
the probability of fast-track promotions of junior bureaucrats, conditional on
being in a particular group. P-values are in parenthesis. This table uses pooled
data and can, therefore, highlight the overall net effect of allowing discretion to
seniors, across all cohorts. This brings us closer to understanding the aggregate
effects of discretion.
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Figure 3.3: The figure shows the average length of career different tax
performing juniors remain fast-tracked
First, for all exam ranks, seniors matter for fast-track promotion of juniors.
The top 10% exam performers have a 20% higher chance of being fast-tracked
when their seniors have above median power. This effect is 7% and 4% for
the mid 80% and bottom 10% exam performers, respectively. Across columns,
those juniors who are top 10% exam performers and who have seniors with
more discretion, have 9% higher probability of being fast-tracked than
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Table 3.2: Diff-in-diff: Are fast-track promotions meritocratic?
Exam performance Difference
Top 10% Mid 80%
Power of seniors
Above median power 0.38∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.09∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07)
Below median power 0.18∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ -0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.32)
Difference 0.20∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.00) (0.05) (0.04)
person × months 17319
cohorts 38
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Note: P-value in parenthesis. The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Each cell is the mean of fast-track promotions.
Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is
defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the civil servant is higher than his or her official rank. Above
(below) median power is classified as a dummy that turns on 1 whenever power of seniors (Power) is above (below) the median
power of a given year. It remains zero otherwise. Exam top 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that are in
the top 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. Mid 80% exam performers are defined accordingly as a dummy that turns
on one for those juniors that are in the mid 80% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. Standard errors are clustered at the
cohort level.
Table 3.3: Diff-in-diff: Are fast-track promotions meritocratic?
Exam performance Difference
Bottom 10% Mid 80%
Power of seniors
Above median power 0.22∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ -0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19)
Below median power 0.18∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ -0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.31)
Difference 0.04 0.07∗ -0.03
(0.57) (0.05) (0.61)
person × months 17491
cohorts 38
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Note: P-value in parenthesis. The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Each cell is the mean of fast-track promotions.
Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is
defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the civil servant is higher than his or her official rank. Above
(below) median power is classified as a dummy that turns on 1 whenever power of seniors (Power) is above (below) the median
power of a given year. It remains zero otherwise. Exam top 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that are in
the top 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. Mid 80% exam performers are defined accordingly as a dummy that turns
on one for those juniors that are in the mid 80% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. Standard errors are clustered at the
cohort level.
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mid 80%. On the other hand, promotions are not meritocratic when seniors
have below median power. This results in an overall difference-in-difference of
13%.
Results suggest that on net, it is in fact discretion of seniors that results
in meritocracy. Table 3.3 presents results from a similar pooled difference-
in-difference but for the bottom 10% exam performers. While the average
difference-in-difference is negative, it is not statistically significantly different
from zero. Those bottom 10% exam performers, whose seniors have above
median promotion power, have a 22% probability of fast-track promotions.
This probability is 7% lower than the mid 80% exam performers. If we
consider those whose first seniors have below median promotion power, then
the difference is 4% lower for bottom 10% than the mid 80%. This results in a
negative overall difference-in-difference of 3%.
While interesting, the results from the pooled diff-in-diff are not causal.
There can be many cohort specific unobservables that can confound the effect.
As a next step, instead of pooling the data, I include cohort and time fixed
effects to control for any cohort and time specific unobserved heterogeneity.
In this estimation, in a given time period, I compare cohorts that experienced
more of a change in power of their seniors to those that experienced less or no
change and test for heterogeneity of the effect based on exam ranking of the
juniors. The estimation is as follows.
yict = κc + κt + γExamic + piPowerct + φPowerct × Examic + µXict + eict (3.2)
where the outcome yict ∈ {Fast − track,Of f icial promotion} is the prob-
ability of fast-track promotion, official promotion respectively of junior i, of
cohort c, in month-year t. Fast-track promotion is defined as a dummy that
turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher
than his or her official rank. Official promotion is a dummy that turns
on one whenever the bureaucrat is officially promoted to the next rank.
Examic ∈ {top 10%, bottom 10%} are dummy variables that turn on 1 whenever
a junior i, of cohort c, is in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the
recruitment exam, respectively. Powerct is the mean power of the first set of
seniors of a cohort c, in month-year t. It is measured through official rank of
the seniors in the organization. This rank is based on official promotions of the
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seniors, determined by their experience, training and subjective performance
evaluation.
I control for time invariant, cohort specific, unobserved heterogeneity using
cohort fixed effects κc. These control for possible factors such as the total
number of first seniors, time invariant characteristics of the first job etc. Time
varying characteristics, that are similar for all cohorts, are captured by κt. For
example, any policies of the government on creation of new jobs that affect all
cohorts equally, are accounted for by κt.
Using a regression framework allows me to include controls as well. Any
first-match specific effects that co-vary with power of seniors and creates
differences in career trajectory of high and low type juniors, will be a
confounder. To account for such differences, I control for a time trend of the
first job. To increase precision, other controls included are experience of the
junior, experience squared and a dummy for whether the job is in the field
offices. Official rank of the junior is included in the estimation for fast-track
promotions. Error terms are clustered at the cohort level as that is the level at
which first seniors are allocated (Abadie et al. (2017)).
3.2.1 OLS results: Are promotions meritocratic when seniors
have discretion?
Table 3.4 presents results from estimating equation 3.2. Columns (1)-(2) of
table 3.4 show the effect on fast-track promotions of juniors, while column
(3) shows the effect on official promotion. To help in the interpretation of level
effects, power of seniors is demeaned by subtracting the average for each junior
worker.
Column (1), is a pooled OLS with controls but without fixed effects,
while the rest include both. Results show that power of seniors is on
average positively associated with probability of fast-track promotion of junior
workers. A one rank above average increase in the power of seniors is
associated with a 9% increase in fast-track promotions of junior bureaucrats.
The effect is statistically significant and precisely estimated. Like the pooled
difference-in-difference in tables 3.2 and 3.3, this confirms that the higher the
seniors rise in the organization, the more power they exercise over careers of
juniors.
The average effect in column (1) masks heterogeneity of the effect according
to merit of the junior bureaucrats. Results in column (2) show that promotions
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of junior workers at the discretion of seniors is meritocratic. Moreover, when
looking at variation at the cohort level, it is a zero-sum game. With an above
average increase in the rank of the senior, the top 10% exam performing juniors
have a 13% higher probability of being fast-tracked than the mid 80%, while
this effect is negative for the rest of the distribution. The differential effect for
the bottom 10% is not precisely estimated and it is not statistically significant.
However, the p-value from an F-test of α = β is 0.11, suggesting that the effect
at the top and bottom is nearly statistically significantly different from each
other. The total effect of the power of seniors on fast-track promotions of top
10% juniors is economically significant as well. It is nearly the same as one-
third the mean of fast-track promotions.
Table 3.4: OLS - Are discretionary promotions of juniors meritocratic?
Dependent variable:
Fast-track Official
promotions promotions
(1) (2) (3)
Power 0.09** -0.04 0.01**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.00)
Exam Top 10% -0.01 -0.00
(0.04) (0.00)
Exam Bottom 10% -0.06 -0.00
(0.05) (0.00)
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.13* 0.00
(0.07) (0.00)
Power × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -0.06 0.00
(0.10) (0.00)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.11 0.48
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE No Yes Yes
Mean 0.32 0.31 0.01
person x mon 23885 17229 17768
cohorts 44 39 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
47
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average rank of seniors of newly
recruited PAS bureaucrats that work with them in the first job. It is measured as the average official promotions, over time,
of the set of seniors. Official promotions are promotions that are based on experience, training and subjective performance
evaluation of the bureaucrat by the immediate bosses. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the bureaucrat
is officially promoted to the next rank. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants
and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior
bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil
servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam
performers. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample. Experience, experience squared of the
new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy for whether the job is in the field offices is
included. Official rank of the junior is not included in columns (3). Cohort & month-year FE included in all specifications,
except column (1). All specifications exclude first job.
Table 3.4, column (3) tests the effect of power of seniors on official
promotions. For every one rank above average increase in the power of the
first seniors, the mid 80% exam performers have a 1% higher probability of
being officially promoted. The differential effect for the top and the bottom end
of the exam distribution is a precisely estimated zero. Therefore, promotions
where there is very little space for discretion, are in fact not meritocratic.
3.2.2 Identifying variation: Power of potential seniors
Controls and fixed effects still do not overcome the challenges of selection
into teams. Nor does it help overcome the endogenous rise of the senior
in the organizational hierarchy. This rise could easily be correlated with
unobservables of the juniors. Therefore, it is hard to argue that the effects
from table 3.4 are causal.
To overcome the first challenge, this study exploits initial allocation rules
of the government. The Tenure/Transfer Policy of the government implies that
new recruits can only be allocated their first job in a district department where
there is a vacancy or where the incumbent Assistant Commissioner (AC) has
worked at least a year.1 This provides a set of potential seniors that each cohort
of juniors could have been allocated, in the first month of their first job. The set
of potential seniors are the bureaucrats in district departments, with potential
open positions, at the time of first job of juniors. Potential seniors can be
bureaucrats of any group of civil services (PAS, PCS, PMS, PSS or Ministerial
staff). What further aids a causal identification is that end of training of the
juniors is centrally decided by the Federal Government. New recruits cannot
1cf.The Punjab Government Transfer Policy 1980; Inter-Provincial Transfers of DMG/PSP
Officers 1988; Government of Punjab Circular Letter 2004; Guidelines for Transfer of Assistant
Commissioners 2013.
48
choose the timing of the start of their entry-level job and hence cannot select
into a set of potential seniors.
Figure 3.4 shows the average number of potential and actual seniors per
junior, across 39 cohorts from 1975-2012. The mean number of seniors in the
first job are 12. This suggests that juniors work in small group. Therefore,
the possibility of close linkages with seniors and senior possessing local
information on juniors is there. The average number of potential seniors is
27. Therefore, for each actual senior, a junior has approximately two potential
seniors.
Departments with vacancies have people of varying power working in
them. Figure 3.5 shows this cross-sectional variation in power of potential
seniors across cohorts. The mean cross-sectional variation in power of potential
seniors, represented by the red dotted line, is 2.1. Figure 3.6 shows the cross-
sectional correlation between power of actual and potential seniors. Each black
dot is the mean for a cohort. The axis are in units of ranks. We can see that
across cohorts, the two measures of power are positively correlated.
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Figure 3.4: The figure shows the average number of senior bureaucrats per
junior in the sample of cohorts on whom the main analysis is conducted
The second challenge to a causal identification stemmed from the fact
that power, as defined by the official rank of the seniors, was a function
of their subjective performance evaluation and that could be correlated with
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Figure 3.5: Variation in power of potential seniors across cohorts
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Figure 3.6: Cross sectional correlation between power of potential and actual
seniors
the unobservables of the juniors. To overcome this challenge I use the
government’s Minimum Length of Service Rules, that are applicable on official
promotions. This helps create a rule-based measure of power of potential
seniors. The Minimum Length of Service Rules stipulate how the experience of
a bureaucrat can translate into their official promotion. Bureaucrats are eligible
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for one promotion after every 5, 12, 17 and 22 years of entry.2 The career of a
civil servant, according to this rule, is like a step function, shown in figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Rank of seniors according to Minimum Length of Service Rules.
This rule is used to create predicted power of potential seniors.
Power of potential seniors: Combining both the initial allocation and the
Minimum Length of Service Rules, this study is able to classify a cohort-month
level variable: power of potential seniors. In a given time period, it is defined
as the average, rule-based rank of potential seniors, that the cohorts of newly
recruited juniors could have worked with, in the first month, of their first job.
While power of seniors varies from ranks 0-5, power of potential seniors lies
between 0-4. This is because these are the ranks on which the Minimum Length
of Service Rules apply.
For each time period, the power of potential seniors is calculated as:
Power o f potential seniors (Powerp) = ∑
S˜
s˜=1 Rulebased rank o f potential seniorss˜
S˜
(3.3)
where rule-based rank of potential seniors is based on the Minimum
Length of Service Rules and S˜ is the number of potential seniors that are still
in Punjab in that time period. Figure 3.8 shows the time variation in mean
2Establishment Division’s O.M.No.1/9/80-R.2 dated 2-6-1983
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power of potential seniors, across years, for a sample of four cohorts from the
1970s, 80s, 90s and 2000s. The figure shows that power of seniors doesn’t just
go up but it can come down as well. This can be the case when, for instance,
seniors retire. Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of the variable. The mean
Powerp as measured in ranks of seniority is 2.1. When compared to the mean
of actual seniors it appears that potential seniors are higher in rank and have
more power to promote juniors.
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Figure 3.8: Time variation in power of potential seniors
Discussion on assumptions. The analysis rests on the assumption that
vacancies and tenures of incumbent Assistant Commissioners are not system-
atically determined by unobservables of newly recruited cohorts. For instance,
if a star cohort is about to finish training, it is possible that a position is
vacated to make way for these new recruits. I test for this. Table A.9, A.10
show that there is no correlation between the date that training ends and
vacant positions. It remains the case whether I define vacancies in large
districts or whether I define the end of training as the day that training ends
or as the month that training ends. This still leaves the concern that the
quality of the potential places might be systematically different for different
cohorts. Therefore, characteristics of the potential job match could be arguably
correlated with power of potential seniors and fast-track promotions of juniors.
Table A.11 shows that vacancy and tenure of AC positions are not predicted
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by time-varying district characteristics. While it is hard to think of any first-
job specific characteristics that could be correlated with rule-based power
measures, I control for time trend of the first job.
3.2.3 Reduced form: Are promotions meritocratic when se-
niors have discretion?
In this subsection, a reduced form estimation with cohort and time fixed effects
is implemented. In this estimation, in a given month-year, I compare cohorts
that experienced more of a change in Powerp to those that experienced less
or no change. I test for heterogeneity of the effect based on exam ranking of
the juniors. The assumption is that there is nothing that is correlated with
fast-track promotions and varied systematically between top and mid exam
performers, in cohorts that experienced more of a change in Powerp and those
that experienced less change. The reduced form estimation is as follows:
yict = γc + γt + µExamic + χPower
p
ct + φExamic× Powerpct + φXict + νict (3.4)
where all the variables are the same as in equation 3.2, except power of
potential seniors (Powerpct). It varies over cohort-month and is the average,
rule-based rank of the first set of potential seniors that cohorts of junior PAS
bureaucrats could have worked with, in their first job. Error terms are clustered
at the cohort level as that is the level at which first seniors are allocated (Abadie
et al. (2017)).
Table 3.5, columns (7)-(9) present reduced form results, while columns (1)-
(3) report the OLS results for comparison. Conditional on the exclusion and
monotonicity assumptions, I also present the IV results in columns (4)-(6).
Columns (3), (6) and (9) study official promotions, while the rest investigate
fast-track promotions. Table 3.6 reports the first stage estimates from the IV.
Columns (1), (4) and (7) report results without fixed effects while all the other
results include cohort and month-year fixed effects.
First stage results in table 3.6 suggest that there is no differential effect of
power of potential seniors on power of actual seniors. I report the Angrist-
Pischke (2008) F-statistic at the bottom of the table.3 The F-statistic provides
3For a single regressor AP F-statistic and Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-test are the same. I
report AP F-statistic since it tests whether even one of the endogenous regressor is under or
weakly identified.
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Table 3.5: Second stage - Are discretionary promotions of juniors meritocratic?
OLS IV Reduced Form
Fast-track Official Fast-track Official Fast-track Official
promotions promotions promotions promotions promotions promotions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Power 0.09** -0.04 0.01** 0.09* -0.08 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.05) (0.09) (0.01)
Exam Top 10% -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00
(0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Exam Bot 10% -0.06 -0.00 -0.06 -0.00 -0.06 -0.00
(0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.13* 0.00 0.14* 0.00
(0.07) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
Power × Exam Bot 10% (β) -0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.00
(0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00)
Powerp 0.07* -0.03 0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.00)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.09* 0.00
(0.05) (0.00)
Powerp × Exam Bot 10% (β) -0.04 -0.00
(0.07) (0.00)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.11 0.48 0.17 0.05 0.16 0.07
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean 0.32 0.31 0.01 0.31 0.31 0.01 0.31 0.31 0.01
person x mon 23885 17229 17768 23714 17166 17699 23959 17411 17945
cohorts 44 39 39 43 39 39 43 39 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based seniority, over time, of the first
set of potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Official promotions are promotions that are based on
experience, training and subjective performance evaluation of the bureaucrat by the immediate bosses. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one
whenever the bureaucrat is officially promoted to the next rank. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants
and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than
his or her official rank. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort
in the recruitment exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample.
Experience, experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy for whether the job is in the field
offices is included. Official rank of the junior is not included in columns (3), (6) and (9). Cohort & month-year FE included in all specifications, except
column (1), (4) and (7). All specifications exclude first job.
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Table 3.6: First stage - Are discretionary promotions of juniors meritocratic?
Dependent variable:
Power of seniors (power)
(1) (2) (3)
Powerp 0.70*** 0.54*** 0.52***
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) -0.11 -0.13
(0.10) (0.09)
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -0.03 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
Exam Top 10% -0.02 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Exam Bottom 10% 0.07** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03)
AP F Statistic-I 372 54 53
AP F Statistic-II 139 182
AP F Statistic-III 414 351
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE No Yes Yes
person x mon 23714 17166 17699
cohorts 43 39 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based seniority, over
time, of the first set of potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Official promotions
are promotions that are based on experience, training and subjective performance evaluation of the bureaucrat by the immediate
bosses. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the bureaucrat is officially promoted to the next rank. Fast-track
promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as
a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Exam top
(bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment
exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Angrist & Pischke (2009) f-stat is reported for each endogenous variable
at the bottom. Experience, experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy
for whether the job is in the field offices is included. Official rank of the junior is not included in columns (3). Cohort & month-year
FE included in all specifications, except column (1). All specifications exclude first job.
some evidence that power of potential seniors is relevant in predicting power
of actual seniors.
There are three main takeaways from these set of results. First, as seniors
rise in the organization, they exercise more discretion over careers of juniors.
The average effect of power of seniors on fast-track promotions of juniors is
positive and significant in all specifications. Second, like the pooled difference-
in-difference results, discretionary promotions by seniors are meritocratic.
Reduced form results in column (8) show that with a one rank above average
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increase in Powerpct, the top 10% exam performers are 9% more likely to be fast-
tracked than the mid 80%. The total effect for the top 10% exam performers is
one-fifth of the mean of fast-track promotions, suggesting that the effects are
not just statistically but also economically significant.
The differential effect on the bottom 10% is negative but not significant.
In column (8), the total effect for bottom 10% is negative and of a similar
magnitude as the top. An F-test of α = β has a p-value of 0.11 and 0.16 in
columns (2) and (8) respectively. The third takeaway from the table is with
respect to the results on official promotions. A surprising aspect here is that
the effect of power of senior materializes only for discretionary promotions of
juniors. Those promotions that are constrained by rules are, in fact, not affected
by the discretion of seniors. In the reduced form and IV estimations, all the
effects are a precisely estimated zero. This suggests that in this bureaucracy,
rules are followed.
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Figure 3.9: The figure plots the predicted probability of fast-track promotions
from the reduced form model in column (8) of table 3.5. Each dot is the
predicted probability and the bars are 90% confidence intervals. Fast-track
promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and
the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on
one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or
her official rank. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based
rank, over time, of potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have
worked with in the first job. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on
one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in
the recruitment exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam performers.
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Figure 3.10: The figure plots the predicted probability of official promotions
from the reduced form model in column (9) of table 3.5. Each dot is the
predicted probability and the bars are 90% confidence intervals. Official
promotions are promotions that are based on experience, training and
subjective performance evaluation of the bureaucrat by the immediate bosses.
Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based rank, over time,
of potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in
the first job. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those
civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment
exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam performers.
Figure 3.9 plots the probability of fast-track promotions from the reduced
form model in column (8) of table 3.5. On the y-axis is the effect on probability
of fast-track promotions of juniors and on the x-axis is power of potential
seniors. As discussed power of potential seniors is measured in ranks between
0-4. Each dot is the predicted probability from the model in column (8) of table
3.5 and the bars are 90% confidence intervals. Pictorially, figure 3.9 presents
the same idea. Fast-track promotions by seniors are meritocratic.
Figure 3.10 plots the probability of official promotions from the reduced
form model in column (9) of table 3.5 and shows that there is no effect of
power of potential seniors on the probability of official promotions of juniors.
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3.3 A decadal cohort analysis: Have promotions by
seniors always been meritocratic?
I further investigate heterogeneity of the effect across different cohorts from
1980-2010. For uniformity in creating bins of cohorts, I restrict attention to
3 decades of cohorts. Table 3.7 reports reduced form results while table 3.8
reports OLS and IV estimates.
The first key takeaway from these results is that seniors did not always
exercise their discretion meritocratically. With an increase in power of seniors
the bottom 10% exam performers were favored in the 1980s, while the mid 80%
and top 10% were not. This trend reversed starting from the 1990s cohorts and
continued for cohorts between 2001-2010. In subsection 4.2, I investigate the
mechanism behind these trends.
For cohorts that were recruited in the 1980s, column (1) of table 3.7
shows that with an above average increase in Powerp, the bottom 10% exam
performers have a 22% higher probability of being fast-tracked than the mid
80%. The effect on mid 80% is negative 9%, while the differential effect for
the top 10% is negative 1%. The effects on mid 80% and top 10% are not
significant. This trend holds across all specifications. At the bottom of the
table 3.7, in column (1), I test whether α = β. The p-value is zero, suggesting
that the effect on the top and the bottom is statistically different from each
other.
Interestingly this trend changes for cohorts that start their training in the
1990s. In column (1) of table 3.7, the total effect for the bottom 10% from the
1990-2000s is a negative 24%, which is three-fourth of the mean of fast-track
promotions. While the total effect for top 10% is a positive 32% which is nearly
the same as the mean of fast-track promotions. In column (1), an F-test of
µ = pi rejects the null with a p-value of zero across all specifications. The trend
of meritocratic promotion at the discretion of the senior continues for the 2001-
2010 cohorts as well, albeit with less difference between the top 10% and mid
80% than for the 1990s cohorts.
58
Table 3.7: Reduced form - Are discretionary promotions of juniors
meritocratic?
Fast-track Official
promotions promotions
(1) (2)
Cohorts of 1981-1990
Powerp -0.09 -0.00
(0.07) (0.00)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) -0.01 -0.00
(0.06) (0.01)
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% (β) 0.22*** 0.00
(0.07) (0.00)
Cohorts of 1991-2000
Powerp × cohort90s 0.04 -0.00
(0.07) (0.00)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% × cohort90s (µ) 0.38** 0.02***
(0.15) (0.01)
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% × cohort90s (pi) -0.41*** -0.01**
(0.10) (0.00)
Cohorts of 2001-2010
Powerp × cohort2000s 0.55*** 0.01
(0.13) (0.01)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% × cohort2000s (θ) 0.05 0.01
(0.26) (0.01)
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% × cohort2000s (η) -0.69** -0.01
(0.26) (0.02)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.00 0.77
Ho: µ=pi (p-value) 0.00 0.00
Ho: θ=η (p-value) 0.01 0.47
Controls Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes
Mean 0.31 0.01
person x mon 12567 15096
cohorts 31 31
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
59
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based rank,
over time, of potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Official promotions are
promotions that are based on experience, training and subjective performance evaluation of the bureaucrat by the immediate
bosses. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the bureaucrat is officially promoted to the next rank. Fast-track
promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined
as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Exam
top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the
recruitment exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable in the
estimation sample. Cohort & month-year FE, experience, experience squared of the junior, time trend of the first job, official
rank of the junior and dummy for whether the job is in the field offices is included. Official rank of the junior is not included
in columns (2). All specifications exclude first job.
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Table 3.8: Second stage - Are discretionary promotions of juniors meritocratic?
OLS IV
Fast-track Official Fast-track Official
promotions promotions promotions promotions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cohorts of 1981-1990
Power -0.19* 0.01* -0.08 -0.00
(0.09) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00)
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) -0.08 0.01 -0.05 -0.00
(0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
Power × Exam Bottom 10% (β) 0.24*** 0.00 0.25*** 0.00
(0.06) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
Cohorts of 1991-2000
Power × cohort90s 0.02 -0.00 0.07 -0.00
(0.08) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00)
Power × Exam Top 10% × cohort90s (µ) 0.35 0.00 0.55*** 0.02
(0.24) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01)
Power × Exam Bottom 10% × cohort90s (pi) -0.46*** -0.01 -0.53*** -0.01*
(0.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00)
Cohorts of 2001-2010
Power × cohort2000s 0.20 0.02*** 0.80*** 0.01
(0.12) (0.01) (0.24) (0.02)
Power × Exam Top 10% × cohort2000s (θ) 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.36) (0.02) (0.43) (0.03)
Power × Exam Bottom 10% × cohort2000s (η) -0.43* -0.00 -1.12** -0.02
(0.24) (0.01) (0.42) (0.04)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.00 0.50 0.01 0.83
Ho: µ=pi (p-value) 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.04
Ho: θ=η (p-value) 0.25 0.97 0.04 0.52
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.31 0.01 0.31 0.01
person x mon 12525 15051 12525 15049
cohorts 31 31 31 31
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average rank of seniors of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats
that work with them in the first job. It is measured as the average official promotions, over time, of the set of seniors. Official promotions are
promotions that are based on experience, training and subjective performance evaluation of the bureaucrat by the immediate bosses. It is defined as
a dummy that turns on one whenever the bureaucrat is officially promoted to the next rank. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion
of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior
bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top
(bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Mean is mean value for the outcome
variable in the estimation sample. Experience, experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy
for whether the job is in the field offices is included. Official rank of the junior is not included in columns (2) and (4). Cohort & month-year FE
included in all specifications. All specifications exclude first job.
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Results in this chapter suggest that promotions at the discretion of seniors
have not always been meritocratic. This begs the question of why we see
meritocracy of discretionary promotions when we do. The next chapter
takes up this line of inquiry and suggests two potential mechanism for why
discretion can result in meritocratic promotions, i.e. direct self interest of the
senior through a discretion in the choice of their team and reputation concerns
of seniors on referrals of juniors.
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Chapter 4
Why are discretionary promotions
meritocratic?
This chapter investigates potential reasons for why promotions are mer-
itocratic. When considering delegation of decisions, Holmstrom (1978),
Holmstrom et al. (1982) argue that questions of whether objectives of the
person exercising discretion are aligned with those of the organization, are
important. Prendergast & Topel (1993) and Prendergast & Topel (1996) provide
conditions under which discretion can result in the use of local information
rather than patronage: ge.
Favoritism is accentuated when the supervisor is not responsible
for the performance of the subordinate. A means of aligning
the supervisor’s incentives with those of the organization is to tie
rewards to promotion and to make the supervisor responsible for
the output of the job to which his subordinates are promoted...the
firm can reduce favoritism by requiring that supervisors maintain
responsibility for their promoted subordinates. (Prendergast &
Topel (1993) p.360)
This study follows this line of reasoning and empirically tests for whether
seniors promote meritocratically in their own self interest. Two mechanisms
are tested. First, whether seniors promote meritocratically because seniors
don’t just have discretion in promotions of junior workers, but they also have
additional discretion over the choice of their team members. Since the type
of people promoted in the senior’s team have a direct affect on their own
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performance, the chances that a bottom performer is pulled into their team and
promoted are low. One can expect this to be reverse for the top performers.1
Second, a complementary reason behind meritocracy is also investigated.
If with increased power of seniors, only high exam performing juniors move
across other teams and get fast-track promotions there, then that is consistent
with the idea that: first, there are referrals by seniors; and second, reputation
of the senior matters to him or her.
Using a multinomial logit framework, this study is able to test not just
the existence but also the relative strength of these competing mechanisms. A
multinomial logit also allows for a well defined reference category and can
help exploit the richness of the data more than a linear specification would.
For j=1, 2 and 3, the estimation of interest is as follows:
ln
P(wict = j)
P(wict = J)
= ρcj + ρtj + θjExamic + κjPowerct + αjPowerct × Exam top 10ic
+ β jPowerct × Exam bottom 10ic + λjXict (4.1)
where
• j=1 if junior i, in cohort c and month-year t is not fast-track promoted
(base category)
• j=2 if junior starts working in other teams & gets fast-track promoted
• j=3 if junior starts working in any senior’s team & gets fast-track
promoted
Power is the power of seniors. It is defined as the average official rank
of first seniors that juniors work with in their first job. In the reduced form
estimation, Power is replaced with power of potential seniors (Powerp). Power
of potential seniors is the average, rule-based rank of the potential seniors that
juniors could have worked with, in their first job. Exam top 10%, bottom 10%
are dummy variables that turn on 1 whenever a junior i, of cohort c, is in the
top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. Cohort and month-
year FE, experience of the junior, experience squared, time trend of the first job,
official rank of the junior and dummy for whether the job is in the field offices
1This analysis rests on the premise that seniors care about their own performance. In a
way this test also sheds light on how this particular Pakistani bureaucracy works.
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is included. All specifications exclude first job. Error terms are clustered at
the cohort level as that is the level at which seniors are allocated (Abadie et al.
(2017)).
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Figure 4.1: The figure shows average time spent by different exam performing
juniors in the team of the first seniors. I exclude the first job where junior
workers meet their first seniors and see what is the probability that in the rest
of the long run career of the first seniors and junior workers systematically
work together
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Figure 4.2: The figure shows the average length of time different exam
performing juniors remain fast-tracked in the team of the first seniors.
Figure 4.1 presents descriptive evidence on the long-run probability of
juniors working in the team of their first seniors, split by exam performance.
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Figure 4.3: This figure shows the average share of different exam performing
juniors that are fast-tracked per month in the team of the first senior versus
other teams. This probability is reported for the long run career of juniors after
excluding their first job, where juniors meet their first seniors.
Data suggests that in the long-run, the top 10% have a 27% probability of
working in the team of their first seniors. One-third of their career in the
bureaucracy is spent in the team of those seniors they met in the first job. The
percentage is similar for the mid 80% exam performers, while it is higher for
bottom 10%. On average, bottom 10% exam performers systematically end up
in the team of their first seniors, more than the rest of the juniors.
Figure 4.2 presents descriptive evidence on fast-track promotions within
the team of seniors. The figure suggests that promotions in the senior’s
team are meritocratic. While bottom 10% exam performers might end up
systematically more in the team of their first seniors, when it comes to fast-
track promotions, it is the high types that are more likely to get promoted. If
we take an average top 10% exam performer, data suggests that they will spend
20% of their career fast-tracked in the team of the seniors. The percentage is
18% for the mid 80% and 12% for the bottom 10% exam performers.
Figure 4.3 presents similar evidence according to the share of juniors that
are fast-tracked in a given month. The share of juniors fast-tracked are split
both by exam performance and by the types of teams. In any given month,
we can see that promotions are meritocratic in the team of seniors. On the
other hand, promotions in other teams is more or less similar across exam
performance. Below results using multinomial logit estimation are presented.
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Table 4.1: Multinomial logit: Why are discretionary promotions meritocratic?
Base category: not fast-track promoted
Start Start Start Start Start Start
work in work in work in work in work in work in
other senior’s other senior’s other senior’s
teams & team & teams & team & teams & team &
Promoted Promoted Promoted Promoted Promoted Promoted
IV-control function Reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Power -0.37 -0.20 -0.32 -0.32
[0.27] [0.71] [0.64] [0.74]
Exam Top 10% -0.51 0.00 -0.55* -0.00 -0.49 -0.02
[0.14] [1.00] [0.09] [1.00] [0.16] [0.97]
Exam Bottom 10% -0.46 -0.55 -0.56* -0.59 -0.52* -0.57
[0.18] [0.41] [0.08] [0.39] [0.07] [0.40]
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.07 0.61 0.44 1.22**
[0.90] [0.11] [0.50] [0.03]
Power × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -0.33 -1.50 -0.07 -2.39*
[0.71] [0.19] [0.95] [0.06]
Powerp -0.11 -0.19
[0.77] [0.70]
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.40 0.95***
[0.42] [0.00]
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -0.08 -1.47*
[0.91] [0.09]
α=β (p-value) 0.71 0.03 0.69 0.00 0.59 0.00
Other teams (α)=Seniors team (α) (p-value) 0.26 0.16 0.16
Other teams (β)=Seniors team (β) (p-value) 0.20 0.04 0.07
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes
person x mon 16736 16697 16885
cohorts 39 39 39
+ p<0.12, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Bootstrapped p-values in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Fast-track promotions is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the
junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. I define working in the senior’s teams and promoted is a dummy that turns on one whenever the
juniors is working in the team of their first seniors. These two variables are used to create the different categories for multinomial logit. Power of seniors
(Power) is the average official rank, over time, of the first set of seniors. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based rank, over time, of
potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil
servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Cohort & month-year
FE, experience, experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy for whether the job is in the field
offices is included. All specifications exclude first job.
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4.1 Results: Why are discretionary promotions mer-
itocratic?
Table 4.1 presents the main results on why discretionary promotions are
meritocratic. The base category in the analysis is the probability of the junior
not being fast-tracked. The first two columns of table 4.1 report results for a
simple multinomial logit without accounting for any potential endogeneity
of Power. While columns (3)-(4) report multinomial IV results using a
control function approach. This is implemented following standard techniques
suggested by Petrin & Train (2010) and Imbens & Wooldridge (2007). Columns
(5)-(6) present the reduced form results. Score bootstrap p-values, as suggested
by Kline & Santos (2012) and implemented through Roodman et al. (2019)’s
program in Stata, are reported in parenthesis. The coefficients reported are log
relative risk ratios, relative to the base category.
While the first column in all specifications sheds light on whether there are
referrals and whether seniors care about their reputation on referrals of juniors;
the second column investigates whether seniors promote meritocratically in
their direct self interest, i.e. they have discretion in the choice of their teams
and fast-track promotions in it.
Reduced form results in column (6) of table 4.1 show that a one rank
above average increase in the power of potential senior results in nearly one
time higher log of relative risk ratio for the top 10% exam performers to start
working in the seniors team and be fast-track promoted there (relative to the
base category). The effect is statistically significant and precisely estimated.
The bootstrapped p-value is zero. The effect is similar when using a control
function. In column (2) the p-value of the effect is 0.11, suggesting that the
effect is also nearly significant using a simple multinomial logit.
While the differential effect for the top is positive, it is large and negative
for the bottom 10% exam performers. In the reduced form results in column
(6), a one rank above average increase in the power of seniors leads to nearly
1.5 times lower log of relative risk ratio for the bottom 10% exam performers
to start working in the seniors team and be fast-tracked there (relative to the
base category). This effect is larger when using a control function approach.
Effects reported in column (2) are similar but less precise (the p-value is 0.19).
At the bottom of the table, an F-test of α = β, within the team of the senior,
rejects the null in all specifications.
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Results show that there is also a complementary effect that operates
through reputation concerns of seniors on referrals. However, it is not as strong
as the effect for the seniors own team. In column (5) of table 4.1, reduced form
results show that a one rank above average increase in the power of seniors
results in nearly 0.4 times higher log of relative risk ratio for the top 10% exam
performers to move teams and be fast-tracked (relative to the base category).
This effect is half of the effect that we find for the senior’s own team in column
(6). However, we cannot statistically significantly reject that the effect on the
senior’s own team and other teams, for the top 10% exam performing juniors
is the same. The p-value is low (0.16).
Relative to the base category, with an increase in power of seniors, referrals
of bottom 10% exam performing juniors to other teams is negative but the
magnitude is low and the effect is not statistically significant. This is in contrast
to the large negative effect we find when we consider discretion of the senior
to create their own team. An F-test of the interaction effect for bottom 10%
exam performers moving to senior’s own team versus other teams rejects the
null for both the reduced form and IV-control function specifications.
Results are in line with what Prendergast & Topel (1993) argue. Since a
low type in the team can negatively impact the senior’s own performance,
therefore, seniors with discretion ensure that a bottom 10% performer does
not start work in their team and get fast-tracked there. This is the reverse for
top 10% exam performers. Moreover, there are referrals by seniors to other
teams and given their meritocratic nature, reputation does matter to the senior.
However, compared to the effect on their own team, these do not appear to be
of first order importance.
Taken together, these results suggest that incentives of the person exercis-
ing discretion is key for meritocracy of discretionary promotions. If institutions
are such that these incentives are aligned with that of the organization then the
chance of meritocracy is high.
4.2 A move to meritocracy: What can we learn from
the decadal analysis of cohorts?
Chapter 3.3 shows how fast-track promotions by seniors varied over different
decades of cohorts of juniors. Results showed that discretionary promotions
were not meritocratic for the 1980s cohorts while this trend reversed in the
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1990s. In this chapter, I investigate the reasons behind these trends in
meritocracy. The key motivation behind the analysis is: first, to understand the
decadal trends in discretion in team formation as well as reputation concerns
of seniors on referrals; and second, to investigate whether (and which) of the
two competing mechanisms can help shed light on the move to meritocracy of
promotions starting from the 1990s cohorts.
Multinomial logit regression results are reported in table 4.2 and 4.3.
Estimation is similar as in equation 4.1 with an added layer of heterogeneity
by decades of cohorts of juniors. As in chapter 3.3, the analysis is restricted to
3 decades of cohorts from 1980-2010. Table 4.2 columns (1)-(2) present results
using Power while columns (3)-(4) report results using an IV-control function
approach. Table 4.3 reports reduced form results. The base category is not
fast-track promoted. Columns (1) and (3) in table 4.2 and column (1) in table
4.3, show the effect of power of seniors on moves of juniors across other teams
and promotions there, while columns (2) and (4) in table 4.2 and column (2) in
table 4.3, report results for moves to and promotions in senior’s own team.
There are two main takeaways. First, when it comes to the senior’s own
team, the senior persistently pushes out a bottom 10% exam performing junior
and does not promote them. On the other hand, the senior brings into their
team and promotes a top 10% exam performer. This effect persists even for the
1980s cohorts, that did not experience meritocratic discretionary promotions
on average. However, the effects are not significant across all specifications.
It appears that self-interest of the senior remains an important determinant of
meritocracy of promotions.
Second, a change in moves to and promotion in other teams, mimics the
trend of meritocratic discretionary promotions starting in the 1990s, shown in
chapter 3.3. For the 1980s cohorts, relative to the base category, with an increase
in power of the seniors, the log of relative risk ratio is higher for bottom 10%
exam performers to move teams and be fast-track promoted. The effect is large
and precisely estimated with a p-value of zero across all specifications. On the
other hand, top 10% exam performers are less likely to move teams and be fast-
tracked. The positive differential effect for the bottom 10% exam performers is
much larger than the negative effect for the top 10%. An F-test at the bottom
of the table testing α = β has a p-value of zero across all specifications. This
suggests that referrals by seniors in the 1980s were not meritocratic. However,
this trend reversed in the 1990s and 2000s.
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Moreover, in nearly all specifications for these decades, I can reject that the
effect of power of seniors on the top and bottom end of the exam distribution
(µ = pi, θ = η), is the same. This suggests that starting in the 1990s reputation
concerns of the senior referring a junior to other teams became important; so
that referrals of low type reduced, while those of high type increased.
Overall, results of the decadal analysis in this chapter are consistent with
the idea that it was a change in reputation concerns of seniors on referrals
that might be a driver of the move towards meritocracy in the 1990s. It would
be important to investigate this further and understand what triggered this
change. One potential explanation behind this shift can be a change from
a military dictatorship to democratically elected governments in the 1990s.
It is possible that democratic governments allowed more discretion to senior
bureaucrats and the environment triggered salience of reputation concerns on
referrals by seniors. It is possible that such a change persisted through the
decades, even when Pakistan reverted back to dictatorship in 1999. Future
research should investigate these aspects further.
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Table 4.2: Multinomial logit: Why are discretionary promotions meritocratic?
Base category: not fast-track promoted
Start Start Start Start
work in work in work in work in
other senior’s other senior’s
teams & team & teams & team &
Promoted Promoted Promoted Promoted
IV-control function
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cohorts of 1981-1990
Power -0.03 0.83 -0.04 -1.17
[0.93] [0.25] [0.94] [0.36]
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) -0.85* 0.76 -0.97* 1.42*
[0.05] [0.26] [0.08] [0.06]
Power × Exam Bottom 10% (β) 2.67*** -1.06 3.95*** -1.28
[0.00] [0.34] [0.00] [0.28]
Cohorts of 1991-2000
Power × cohort90s -0.70 -1.80 -0.59 0.65
[0.12] [0.17] [0.49] [0.68]
Power × Exam Top 10% × cohort90s (µ) 1.55 0.52 2.16 1.95*
[0.44] [0.36] [0.21] [0.09]
Power × Exam Bottom 10% × cohort90s (pi) -5.07*** -3.90* -6.42*** -5.28**
[0.00] [0.08] [0.00] [0.02]
Cohorts of 2001-2010
Power × cohort2000s 1.07 -0.32 3.13* 7.58**
[0.12] [0.81] [0.05] [0.02]
Power × Exam Top 10% × cohort2000s (θ) -0.30 -0.64 1.10 -0.96
[0.81] [0.53] [0.75] [0.67]
Power × Exam Bottom 10% × cohort2000s (η) -4.87** 1.52 -9.28*** -3.85
[0.01] [0.31] [0.00] [0.44]
α=β (p-value) 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.04
Other teams (α)=Seniors team (α) (p-value) 0.06 0.03
Other teams (β)=Seniors team (β) (p-value) 0.01 0.00
µ=pi (p-value) 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
θ=η (p-value) 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.46
Other teams (θ)=Seniors team (θ) (p-value) 0.76 0.48
Other teams (η)=Seniors team (η) (p-value) 0.01 0.47
Controls Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes
person x mon 12405 12404
cohorts 31 31
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+ p<0.12, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Bootstrapped p-values in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Fast-track promotions is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank
of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. I define working in the senior’s (other) teams and promoted is a dummy that turns
on one whenever the juniors is (not) working in the team of their first seniors. These two variables are used to create the different categories for
multinomial logit. Power of seniors (Power) is the average official rank, over time, of the first set of seniors. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that
turns on one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam
performers. Cohort & month-year FE and controls included. All specifications exclude first job.
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Table 4.3: Multinomial logit: Why are discretionary promotions meritocratic?
Base category:
not fast-track promoted
Start Start
work in work in
other senior’s
teams & team &
Promoted Promoted
Reduced form
(1) (2)
Cohorts of 1981-1990
Powerp -0.09 -0.15
[0.80] [0.80]
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) -0.75** 0.48
[0.03] [0.30]
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% (β) 2.97*** -0.85
[0.00] [0.31]
Cohorts of 1991-2000
Powerp × cohort90s -0.67 -0.53
[0.13] [0.59]
Powerp × Exam Top 10% × cohort90s (µ) 1.37 1.30*
[0.38] [0.07]
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% × cohort90s (pi) -4.81*** -3.03*
[0.00] [0.05]
Cohorts of 2001-2010
Powerp × cohort2000s 1.82* 3.00*
[0.05] [0.08]
Powerp × Exam Top 10% × cohort2000s (θ) 0.69 0.24
[0.71] [0.86]
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% × cohort2000s (η) -5.81** -0.42
[0.01] [0.82]
α=β (p-value) 0.00 0.13
Other teams (α)=Seniors team (α) (p-value) 0.03
Other teams (β)=Seniors team (β) (p-value) 0.00
µ=pi (p-value) 0.00 0.00
θ=η (p-value) 0.02 0.75
Other teams (θ)=Seniors team (θ) (p-value) 0.75
Other teams (η)=Seniors team (η) (p-value) 0.06
Controls Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes
person x mon 12430
cohorts 31
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+ p<0.12, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Bootstrapped p-values in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Fast-track promotions is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank
of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. I define Working in the senior’s (other) teams and promoted is a dummy that turns
on one whenever the juniors is (not) working in the team of their first seniors. These two variables are used to create the different categories for
multinomial logit. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based rank, over time, of potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats
could have worked with in the first job. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom)
10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Cohort & month-year FE and controls included.
All specifications exclude first job.
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Chapter 5
Do seniors use their private
information to promote
meritocratically?
The analysis in the previous chapters tested for meritocracy of discretionary
promotions using observable measures of merit. However, the true value of
allowing discretion to seniors to promote, is to allow them to use their private
information on juniors in promotion decisions. Testing whether seniors use
their private information meritocratically allows an insight into the true cost of
imposing rigid rules that take away subjectivity.
Before I proceed to the estimation and results, some institutional features
are worth mentioning. First, in this setting, seniors never enjoy complete
discretion on careers of juniors. Fast-track promotion decisions are made
by more than one senior civil servant, under the final authority of the chief
executive of the province. While rest of the decision makers only observe the
career charts of the junior bureaucrats and their exam ranking, it is just the
first seniors that also observe tax performance of juniors. Therefore, the use of
this private information by the seniors is not cost-less. Any effects operate in
a constrained environment and can be thought of as the lower bound on the
true effects of allowing complete discretion.
Figure 5.1 shows the probability of different exam performing juniors to be
top 10% tax collectors. The figure shows that being a good exam performer
differentially predicts better tax collection, however, the correlation is not one-
for-one. A top 10% exam performer has a 33% probability of being a top
10% tax collector. The probability for the mid 80% and bottom 10% exam
performers is 20% and 14% respectively. This suggests that exam performance
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does not perfectly predict performance on the job. Therefore, using seniors to
exercise their discretion can be valuable for the organization.
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Figure 5.1: Probability of different exam performing juniors in a cohort to be
top 10% tax collectors.
Results in table 3.1 and figure 3.3 in chapter 3, suggest that the probability
of fast-track promotion of different tax performing juniors is meritocratic on
average, although the differential effects are not significant. In this chapter, I
investigate whether the public and privately observed measures of merit are
complements with discretion. It is important to test this complementarity as
only then can we see whether information is generated for the organization
through discretion. If we find that juniors with the same observable levels
of exam performance, have a different long run career trajectory based on
the private information of the seniors, then it suggests that seniors bring in
extra local information in decision making. This will help shed light on the
true value of discretion. This test is also in line with the institutional features
described above.
Descriptive evidence on fast-track promotions of top 10% exam performers,
by their tax performance and power of seniors is presented in figure 5.2. A
similar exercise is carried out for the bottom 10% exam performers in figure
5.3. It can be seen that for any level of tax performance and power of seniors,
the top 10% exam performers have a higher probability of being fast-tracked
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than the bottom 10% exam performers. However, those with powerful seniors
have a higher probability of fast-track promotions when they are also star tax
collectors. This is the case for both top and bottom 10% exam performers. But
this effect reverses when seniors have less power. Both these figures suggests
that seniors use their private information meritocratically, implying that there
is value from allowing discretion. I explore this further using a regression
framework below.
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Figure 5.2: The figure plots the probability of fast-track promotion of top 10%
exam performers by their tax performance and the power of their seniors
The following specification is implemented:
Fast− trackict = β Powerct×Examic+ θ Powerct×Examic×Taxic+ δWict+uict
(5.1)
where:
Wict = κc + κt + γExamic + ηTaxic + αPowerct + φPowerct × Taxic + µXict
Fast− trackict is the probability of fast-track promotion of junior i, of cohort
c, in month-year t. Fast-track promotion is defined as a dummy that turns on
1 whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her
official rank. Examic ∈ {top 10%,mid 80%} are dummy variables that turn on
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Figure 5.3: The figure plots the probability of fast-track promotion of bottom
10% exam performers by their tax performance and the power of their seniors
1 whenever a junior i, of cohort c, is in the top 10%, mid 80% of their cohort in
the recruitment exam respectively. Taxic is a dummy that turns on 1 whenever
the new recruit i, of cohort c, is in the top 10% of their cohort in tax collection.
I also show results for other classifications of top tax collectors as 20%, 30%,
40% and 50%.
Cohort and month-year FE, experience of the new recruit, time trend of
the first job and official rank of the junior is included. I exclude the first job
from the analysis where juniors get their first seniors. Powerct is the power of
seniors. It is measured as the average official rank of the first set of seniors.
I use power of potential seniors (Powerpct) to induce a source of variation in
power of seniors. Error terms are clustered at the cohort level as that is the
level at which first seniors are allocated (Abadie et al. (2017)).
If we find that β 6= θ for different exam and tax categories, with β < θ,
then that would suggest that seniors exercise discretion using their private
information meritocratically.
5.1 Results: Do seniors use their private informa-
tion meritocratically?
Table 5.1 presents the OLS results, while table 5.2 and 5.3 show the reduced
form and IV results respectively. The first stage of the IV is in table 5.4.
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Columns (1)-(5) use different definitions of Tax. In column (1), in all tables,
I report results defining Tax = Top 10% tax collectors in their cohort. This
definition of Tax is replaced with top 20, top 30, top 40 and top 50% tax
collectors as we move across columns, respectively. In all specifications, across
columns (1)-(5), the omitted category is bottom 10% exam and bottom 90%,
80%, 70%, 60% and 50% tax performers, respectively.
Results in all tables suggest that seniors use their private information
meritocratically and differentiate between juniors with the same observable
measures of merit. Consider juniors that are top 10% exam performers. For
the organization they are star bureaucrats. However, seniors know that not all
of them are star tax collectors. Results in table 5.2 show that those juniors that
are star exam performers, but not star tax collectors, have half the probability
of being fast-tracked by seniors, as compared to those who are star performers
on both dimensions. The effects are economically significant as well. Results
are similar across OLS, IV and reduced form specifications, however, an F-test
testing whether α = β, has a p-value below 0.1 only in the IV and reduced
form specifications.
The interesting thing is that this effect of discretion operates at the bottom
end of the exam distribution as well. Consider those juniors that are bottom
10% exam performers. These are those that are observationally low types.
However, only the senior observes that not all of them are lemons. Results
in table 5.2 show that those bottom 10% exam performers who are star tax
collectors (top 10% tax) have a 2 times higher probability of being fast-tracked
than those who are bottom in both dimensions. These hidden gems are fast-
tracked at nearly the same rate as the mid 80% exam performers. An F-test of
µ = θ rejects equality of the effect in all specifications. The effect is meritocratic
and θ < µ. Results are similar across specifications.
There appears to be no effect of the private information of the first seniors
for the mid 80% exam performers. At the bottom of the table, p-value of
the F-test for pi = γ fails to reject the null in all specifications. One way to
interpret this is to go back to the institutional environment in which seniors
are exercising their discretion. Seniors don’t enjoy complete discretion over
promotions and the use of their private information is not cost-less. Since
others do not get to observe tax performance, convincing other senior civil
servants for promotions of mid might not be worth the pain. There are only
a few positions open for promotions. Therefore, seniors use their private
information to differentiate within the top 10% exam performers. This is done
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Table 5.1: OLS - Do seniors use pvt. info meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
(second job onwards)
Tax=Top 10% Tax=Top 20% Tax=Top 30% Tax=Top 40% Tax=Top 50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Power × Exam Top10% × Tax (α) 0.85*** 0.66 0.69 0.44 0.61
(0.18) (0.39) (0.43) (0.34) (0.41)
Power × Exam Top10% (β) 0.50* 0.32 0.36 0.49 0.59*
(0.24) (0.31) (0.34) (0.34) (0.32)
Power × Exam Mid80% × Tax(pi) 0.33*** 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.35
(0.11) (0.40) (0.42) (0.41) (0.37)
Power × Exam Mid80% (γ) 0.39*** 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.37
(0.11) (0.38) (0.40) (0.41) (0.37)
Power × Exam Bot10% × Tax (µ) 0.40*** -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.18
(0.14) (0.42) (0.45) (0.45) (0.41)
Power (θ) -0.38** -0.16 -0.19 -0.19 -0.36
(0.14) (0.41) (0.43) (0.42) (0.38)
Exam Top10% 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Exam Mid80% 0.13 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 0.13
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Tax 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.83 0.93
Ho: γ=pi (p-value) 0.49 0.55 0.74 0.87 0.76
Ho: µ=θ (p-value) 0.01 0.89 0.82 0.80 0.49
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
person x mon 5668 5668 5668 5668 5668
Cohorts 29 29 29 29 29
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average official rank of seniors of newly recruited PAS
bureaucrats that work with them in the first job. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior bureaucrats and the chief
executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her
official rank. Tax is a dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50% of the cohort in tax collection. Exam top
(bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. The
omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample. Cohort & month-year FE,
experience of the new recruit, time trend of the first job and official rank of the junior is included. All specifications exclude first job.
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Table 5.2: Reduced form - Do seniors use pvt. info meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
(second job onwards)
Tax=Top 10% Tax=Top 20% Tax=Top 30% Tax=Top 40% Tax=Top 50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Powerp × Exam Top10%× Tax (α) 0.97*** 0.99** 0.91** 0.97** 0.72*
(0.20) (0.38) (0.42) (0.40) (0.37)
Powerp × Exam Top10% (β) 0.50*** 0.52 0.69* 0.65* 0.91***
(0.14) (0.36) (0.37) (0.35) (0.32)
Powerp × Exam Mid80% × Tax (pi) 0.23** 0.26 0.39 0.44 0.51
(0.09) (0.39) (0.41) (0.38) (0.36)
Powerp × Exam Mid80% (γ) 0.30*** 0.32 0.43 0.42 0.56
(0.07) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.36)
Powerp × Exam Bot10% × Tax (µ) 0.26** 0.07 0.20 0.22 0.33
(0.12) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.36)
Powerp (θ) -0.23** -0.25 -0.36 -0.36 -0.50
(0.11) (0.37) (0.39) (0.38) (0.35)
Exam Top10% 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Exam Mid80% 0.13 0.13* 0.14* 0.14* 0.13
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Tax 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.05 0.06 0.44 0.22 0.36
Ho: γ=pi (p-value) 0.37 0.43 0.62 0.89 0.44
Ho: µ=θ (p-value) 0.02 0.68 0.49 0.45 0.25
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
person x mon 5701 5701 5701 5701 5701
Cohorts 29 29 29 29 29
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based rank, over time, of potential
seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior
bureaucrats and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat
is higher than his or her official rank. Tax is a dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50% of the cohort
in tax collection. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in
the recruitment exam. The omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample.
Cohort & month-year FE, experience of the new recruit, time trend of the first job and official rank of the junior is included. All specifications exclude
first job.
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Table 5.3: Second stage - Do seniors use pvt. info meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
(second job onwards)
Tax=Top 10% Tax=Top 20% Tax=Top 30% Tax=Top 40% Tax=Top 50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Power × Exam Top10% × Tax (α) 1.33*** 1.34*** 1.42*** 1.49*** 1.52**
(0.13) (0.41) (0.43) (0.45) (0.74)
Power × Exam Top10% (β) 0.70*** 0.70 0.87* 0.82* 1.09**
(0.15) (0.43) (0.45) (0.43) (0.40)
Power × Exam Mid80% × Tax(pi) 0.35*** 0.35 0.50 0.55 0.63
(0.08) (0.48) (0.49) (0.46) (0.44)
Power × Exam Mid80% (γ) 0.43*** 0.42 0.54 0.53 0.69
(0.11) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.43)
Power × Exam Bot10% × Tax (µ) 0.35* 0.09 0.25 0.29 0.39
(0.19) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.46)
Power (θ) -0.34 -0.33 -0.45 -0.44 -0.62
(0.23) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.43)
Exam Top10% 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.07
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Exam Mid80% 0.13 0.13* 0.14* 0.14* 0.13
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Tax 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52
Ho: γ=pi (p-value) 0.36 0.42 0.63 0.85 0.47
Ho: µ=θ (p-value) 0.10 0.66 0.47 0.43 0.25
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
person x mon 5668 5668 5668 5668 5668
Cohorts 29 29 29 29 29
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average official rank of seniors of newly recruited PAS
bureaucrats that work with them in the first job. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior bureaucrats and the chief
executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her
official rank. Tax is a dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50% of the cohort in tax collection. Exam top
(bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. The
omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample. Cohort & month-year FE,
experience of the new recruit, time trend of the first job and official rank of the junior is included. All specifications exclude first job.
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Table 5.4: First stage - Do seniors use pvt. info meritocratically?
Dependent variable:
Promotion power of seniors (Power)
Tax=Top 10% Tax=Top 20% Tax=Top 30% Tax=Top 40% Tax=Top 50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Powerp × Exam Top10%× Tax (α) 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.54* 0.57** 0.21
(0.21) (0.22) (0.28) (0.22) (0.23)
Powerp × Exam Top10% (β) -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Powerp × Exam Mid80% × Tax (pi) 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Powerp × Exam Mid80% (γ) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Powerp × Exam Bot10% × Tax (µ) 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Powerp (θ) -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Exam Top10% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Exam Mid80% -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Tax -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AP F Statistic-I 3379 1825 680 277 22
AP F Statistic-II 1658 450 3708 25790 1578
AP F Statistic-III 631 385 255 262 323
AP F Statistic-IV 655 266 301 432 266
AP F Statistic-V 5870 2999 3980 3496 3441
AP F Statistic-VI 47 624 511 371 407
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
person x mon 5668 5668 5668 5668 5668
Cohorts 29 29 29 29 29
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based rank, over time, of potential
seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Power of seniors (Power) is the average official rank of seniors of newly
recruited PAS bureaucrats that work with them in the first job. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior bureaucrats and
the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his
or her official rank. Tax is a dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50% of the cohort in tax collection. Exam
top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. The
omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Cohort & month-year FE, experience of the new recruit, time trend of the first job and official rank
of the junior is included. All specifications exclude first job. Angrist & Pischke (2009) f-stat is reported for each endogenous variable at the bottom.
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together with keeping the lemons from promotions and giving the hidden
gems a chance. Results can be thought of as a lower bound for when there is
complete discretion allowed to seniors over promotion decisions.
What is more significant is that bottom 10% are only given a chance if they
are star tax collectors and are in the top 10% of tax collection. Even if they are
in top 20% of tax collectors, bottom 10% exam performers are not differentiated
based on their tax performance. This again is suggestive of the fact that the
use of private information is costly in this setting. Convincing others about
the star quality of someone with poor observable performance, is worthwhile
if the person is a complete gem. However, if they don’t outshine it might not
be worthwhile for the seniors to expend their energy in fast-tracking them.1
Using reduced form results in column (1) of table 5.2, figure 5.4 plots
predicted probability of fast-track promotion of juniors, with 90% confidence
interval. Predicted probabilities for star exam-tax performers (red line) as well
as those that are star exam performers, but not star tax collectors (blue dotted
line) are plotted. The x axis is power of potential seniors measured in ranks
from 0-4. The omitted category are the lemons i.e. those juniors that are bottom
10% exam performers and bottom 90% tax collectors. Figure 5.4 presents what
we already saw in table 5.2. Top 10% exam performers that are not star tax
collectors are not fast-tracked as much as star performers on both dimensions.
The effects are large and statistically significantly different from each other.
Figure 5.5 shows a similar relation but for the bottom 10% exam performers.
This figure shows that seniors exercise their discretion to reduce fast-track
promotions for the lemons, while at the same time keeping the hidden gems
(bottom 10% exam performers, who are top 10% tax collectors), from having a
poor career trajectory.
Taken together these results suggest that there is value from allowing
discretion in bureaucracies. Seniors are not just able to decipher hidden lemons
from the stars, but also hidden gems from the bottom of the distribution.
1In line with the fact that the effect does not materialize for most of the exam distribution,
we should not expect the tax performance to matter on its own. Appendix tables A.15 and
A.14 show that that is the case. While above average power of seniors coupled with high exam
performance continues to be a predictor of fast-track promotions, the heterogeneous effect by
tax performance does not. These average effects, however, mask the heterogeneity of effect,
discussed in this section.
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Figure 5.4: The figure plots predicted probability from the reduced form model
in column (1) of table 5.2. Each dot is the predicted probability and the bars
are 90% confidence intervals. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the
discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It
is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior
bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Power of potential seniors
(Powerp) is measured as the average rule-based rank of potential seniors that
the newly recruited PAS civil servants could have worked with in their first
job. Exam top 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that
were the top 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. Tax top 10% is a
dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top 10% of the cohort
in tax collection. Tax performance by junior bureaucrats at their first job is the
private information of the first set of seniors. It is not observed by others in
the organization.
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Figure 5.5: The figure plots predicted probability from the reduced form model
in column (1) of table 5.2. Each dot is the predicted probability and the bars
are 90% confidence intervals. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the
discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It
is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior
bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Power of potential seniors
(Powerp) is measured as the average rule-based rank of potential seniors that
the newly recruited PAS civil servants could have worked with in their first
job. Exam bottom 10% is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants
that were the bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. Tax top 10%
is a dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top 10% of the
cohort in tax collection. Tax performance by junior bureaucrats at their first job
is the private information of the first set of seniors. It is not observed by others
in the organization.
87
Chapter 6
Do seniors improve lateral
allocations?
The thesis aims to investigate discretionary allocations in a bureaucracy. Till
now the focus has been on promotions. This chapter investigates discretionary
lateral allocations by seniors. Allocations of workers across heterogeneous
jobs can generate substantial efficiency gains (Walter (2018)), incentivize
performance (Khan et al. (2018)) and have implications for human capital
investments (Iyer & Mani (2012)). This can be done at little or no additional
costs and can be a significant lever for budget constraint governments in
developing countries. Despite its importance, we know surprisingly little about
how lateral allocations happen in bureaucracies. Moreover, there is little or
no evidence on how discretion is exercised in this respect. Are lateral job
allocations to juniors by their seniors meritocratic? Are they efficient? What
sort of trade-off, if any, exists between meritocracy and efficiency of allocations.
The last part of the thesis investigates these themes.
The analysis is restricted to Assistant Commissioner (AC) jobs. These are
the jobs that juniors perform right at the start of their career. These are similar
in all respect with heterogeneity stemming from location differences. These are
also the jobs for which preference data of different locations is available and
has been digitized for the study.
6.1 Data
Data for this paper of the thesis has been digitized for the first time from
official records of Pakistan Administrative Services Training Campus as well as
Services & General Administration Department (S& GAD) of the government.
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Job location preference data: At the start of their careers, newly recruited
bureaucrats are asked to list their preferred job location from first to fourth
most preferred. There are 36 different district departments. These stated
preferences are for job locations that they would like to train in as Assistant
Commissioners. I use this preference data for training locations to characterize
preferences for actual Assistant Commissioner (AC) jobs. This is done on the
assumption that location preferences for training is the same as preferences for
the job. After interviews with new cohorts of PAS bureaucrats, this assumption
appears to be a very weak one. Almost all juniors wish to train in a location
where they would like to work in as Assistant Commissioners later on.
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Figure 6.1: The figure shows the number of bureaucrats and cohorts for which
job location preference data is available. For consistency the study is restricted
to 2012 cohort. The source of the data is administrative records of PAS training
campus and Services & General Administration Department (S&GAD).
Figure 6.1 describes the number of bureaucrats and cohorts for which
location preference data is available. The source of this data is the adminis-
trative records of Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) training institute and
Services and General Administration Department (S&GAD). Preference data is
available for 13 cohorts and 101 PAS bureaucrats, that start between 1998-2015.
However, for consistency and to be able to observe careers for a few years, I
restrict attention to cohorts that train between 1998-2012. Figure 6.2 describes
the number of bureaucrats with data on first to fourth preference of job
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Figure 6.2: The figure shows the number of bureaucrats with data on their
various preferences for job locations. The source of the data is administrative
records from PAS training campus and Services & General Administration
Department (S&GAD).
location. The figure shows that data on first preference is more comprehensive
than other preferences.
6.1.1 Key variables and descriptive statistics
Preferred job location: Preferred job location is a dummy that turns on 1
whenever a junior is working in any of his or her preferred locations as an
Assistant Commissioner (tax collector).
Pre f erred job location = 1{Junior is working in a pre f erred job location} (6.1)
Competitive job location: To understand the interaction of aggregate versus
individual preferences for a job location, this study categorizes an index of
competitiveness of job locations (districts). It is defined as follows:
Index o f job location competitiveness =
Total demand f or a location
Maximum demand f or any location
(6.2)
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A location has demand if any bureaucrat has ever stated that location to be
in one of their first four preferred job locations. The variable lies between zero
and 1, with 1 being most competitive and zero least.
Figure 6.3 shows the competitiveness of 36 possible job locations (districts)
of Punjab. The provincial capital, Lahore, is the most competitive and has the
highest demand from bureaucrats. Lahore is followed by other big cities like
Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura and Faisalabad.
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Competitiveness of job locations
Figure 6.3: Competitiveness of a location is defined as demand for the job
location as a proportion of maximum demand for any location. The source of
the data is administrative records from PAS training campus and Services &
General Administration Department (S&GAD).
Figure 6.4 presents evidence on correlates of competitiveness of job
locations. The figure plots regression coefficients and 90% confidence intervals
of a regression of index of competitiveness on the location’s characteristics.
The source of data on location characteristics is Development Statistics from
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. As expected from figure 6.3, locations that have
high demand from bureaucrats are more likely to be urban. They are more
likely to have a smaller tax target for Assistant Commissioners (tax collectors).
They are more likely to be higher on education and health indicators, have
more high type roads, factories, tv sets and police stations. Therefore, the
demand for a location correlates well with it’s development profile.
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Capital district
Big cities
Tax target size
Literacy
No. of schools
School enrolment
Hospitals
Rural health centres
High type roads
Registered factories
Telephone connections
Electricity consumption
TV sets
Police stations
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Competitive job location
(Index based on stated desirability)
Correlates of Competitive Job Location
Figure 6.4: This figure plots regression coefficients and their 90% confidence
intervals of a regression of competitive job location index on various location
specific characteristics. Competitiveness index is defined as demand for the
job location as a proportion of maximum demand for any location. The source
of the data is administrative records of PAS training campus and S&GAD.
The source of data on location characteristics is Development Statistics from
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.
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Figure 6.5: The figure shows heterogeneity of preferences. It plots
competitiveness index of junior’s most preferred location by exam performance
of juniors.
Figure 6.5 plots the competitiveness index of juniors’ most preferred job
location. This is shown by exam rank. It shows that not all places that are
competitive on average are also individually preferred by bureaucrats. There
is heterogeneity of individual preferences and this is what I exploit in the study.
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The figure further suggests that ability is a not a huge predictor of whether a
competitive location is also one that is preferred.
The variable used for analysis in the study is competitive job location. It is
specific to the junior bureaucrat and it is defined as:
Competitive job location = Index o f competitiveness o f junior′s job location
(6.3)
It is a continuous variable that varies between zero and one. Zero being the
least competitive and one meaning the junior is working in a location which is
very highly demanded and competitive.
6.2 What type of juniors get competitive vs. pre-
ferred jobs on average?
The starting point of the analysis is an investigation into how job allocations
are carried out on average. This gives us an insight into the system overall and
provides a contrast for job allocations through discretion of seniors.
Figure 6.6 plots the probability of working in a competitive job location
and figure 6.7 plots the probability of working in a preferred job location.
Both figures are split by by exam performance. We see that the top 10%
have a higher probability of working in a competitive position than mid 80%
exam performers, while bottom 10% have the lowest chance of working in a
competitive position. However, when it comes to preferred job locations, there
is a edge of bottom 10% exam performers. The probability that bottom 10%
exam performers will work in their preferred location is 57% as opposed to
41% and 28% for the top 10% and mid 80% exam performers, respectively.
This is further investigated using the following OLS estimation:
yict = pi + αExam Top 10ic + βExam Bottom 10ic + eict (6.4)
where yict ∈ {Competitive job location; pre f erred job location} i.e. the
competitiveness index of the job location of junior i, in cohort c, in month-year
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Figure 6.6: The figure shows the probability of a junior working in a
competitive location in a tax collection job, by exam performance. Exam top
10%, mid 80% and bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on one for those
juniors that are in the top 10%, mid 80% or bottom 10% of their cohort in the
recruitment exam, respectively. In this figure, competitive location is defined
as a dummy that turns on 1 if demand for the location is in the top 25% of
total demand for any location.
t; and the probability of junior working in a preferred job location. Attention
is just restricted to Assistant Commissioner (tax collectot) jobs. Exam top 10%,
bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on 1 for those juniors that are in
the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam, respectively.
eict is the error term that is clustered at the cohort level.
Results: What type of juniors get competitive vs. preferred jobs
on average?
Table 6.1 reports results. Column (1) reports results for competitiveness index
of job location the junior works in, while column (2) shows results of whether
the junior works in his or her preferred location. As location preference data
is reported for a small number of cohorts, I report p-values, using bootstrap-t
procedure, suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008).1 For consistency
this is also done for competitive job locations where the number of cohorts is
41.
1I implement this using the boottest command in STATA (Roodman et al. (2019)).
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Figure 6.7: The figure shows the probability of a junior working in a preferred
location, by exam performance. Exam top 10%, mid 80% and bottom 10% are
dummy variables that turn on one for those juniors that are in the top 10%,
mid 80% or bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam, respectively.
Preferred location is a dummy that turns on 1 whenever a junior is working
as an Assistant Commissioner (tax collector), in a job location that he or she
prefers. The source of the data is administrative records of PAS training
campus and S&GAD.
Exam top (bottom) 10% have a higher (lower) chance of working in a
competitive location but the differential effect is not statistically significantly
different from zero. The p-value of an F-test of α = β is 0.29. In table 6.1,
column (2), we see that the bottom 10% exam performers have a much higher
probability than mid or the top 10%, of working in a job location that is
preferred by them. The probability that a bottom 10% exam performer will
work in their preferred job location is 30% more than the mid 80%. However,
the p-value of an F-test of α = β is 0.40. The differential effect on top 10% is
positive but not significant.
These results suggest that when allocating competitive positions, the orga-
nization weakly differentiates on the basis of ability. However, when allocating
preferred locations, the bottom 10% exam performers are accommodated. If
meritocratic allocations are defined as the high type being allocated their
preferred position instead of the low type, these results are in keeping with
the general image of bureaucracies as nepotistic and inefficient.
I investigate this further by looking at the probability of juniors working in
the following categories of locations: non-competitive & not-preferred,
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Table 6.1: Allocations on average
Competitive Preferred
job location job location
(tax collection jobs)
(1) (2)
Exam Top 10% (α) 0.06 0.13
[0.26] [0.58]
Exam Bottom 10% (β) -0.02 0.30***
[0.69] [0.00]
Constant 0.33*** 0.28***
[0.00] [0.00]
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.29 0.40
Controls No No
Cohort & time FE No No
Mean 0.34 0.35
person x mon 7874 1404
Cohorts 41 10
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cameron Gelbach & Miller (2008) cluster bootstrap-t p-values in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on
one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively. At the
end of training PAS bureaucrats are asked to list their preferred job location from first to fourth most preferred. A
location is preferred if it has ever been categorized as a preferred one by a bureaucrat. Preferred location is a dummy
that turns on 1 whenever a junior is working as a tax collector, in a job location that he or she prefers. Competitive job
location is the index of competitiveness of junior’s job location as an Assistant Commissioner (AC).
non-competitive & preferred, competitive & not-preferred and competitive &
preferred. I keep attention restricted to Assistant Commissioner (AC) jobs
where the juniors mainly collect taxes.
Figure 6.8 shows the probability of junior working in a competitive/preferred
locations by exam performance. All ability groups are nearly equally likely
to be working in positions that are neither competitive nor preferred. As
compared to the other types, bottom 10% exam performers are more likely
to work in their preferred locations for which there is no high demand. The
probability of working in a non-competitive but preferred position is 31%,
while the probability of working in a competitive & not-preferred job location
is just 4%.
On the other hand, the organization allocates more competitive and
preferred positions to top 10% exam performers than other types. 36% of such
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Figure 6.8: The figure shows the probability of a junior working in a
competitive/preferred location in a tax collection job, by exam performance.
Exam top 10%, mid 80% and bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on
one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, mid 80% or bottom 10% of their
cohort in the recruitment exam respectively. Preferred location is a dummy that
turns on 1 whenever a junior is working as a tax collector, in a job location that
he or she prefers. Competitive location is defined as a dummy that turns on 1
if demand for the location is in the top 25% of total demand for any location.
The source of the data is administrative records of PAS training campus and
S&GAD.
jobs are allocated to top 10% juniors, as opposed to 22% and 27% to mid 80%
and bottom 10% exam performers, respectively.
To understand whether these differences are meaningful, a multinomial
logit regression is implemented as follows:
ln
P(Cict = j)
P(Cict = J)
= γj + αjExam top 10ic + β jExam bottom 10ic (6.5)
where
• j=1 if junior i, in cohort c and month-year t starts work in a non-
competitive & not preferred job location (base category)
• j=2 if a junior starts work in a non-competitive & preferred job location
• j=3 if a junior starts work in a competitive & not preferred job location
as an Assistant Commissioner (tax collector). For this estimation, I
characterized working in a competitive job location as a dummy that turns on
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1 if demand for the job location of the junior is in the top 25% of demand for
any location. Preferred job location is characterized as a dummy that turns on
1, whenever a junior is working in a job location that he or she prefers. Exam
top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on 1 for those juniors
that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam,
respectively. Error is clustered at the cohort level. As before, owing to the small
number of cohorts with preference data, Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008)
bootstrap-t p-values are reported in parenthesis. These are implemented using
the boottest command in STATA (Roodman et al. (2019)).
Table 6.2 reports results. As suggested by the previous figures, the
organization appears to favor the bottom 10% exam performers, by allocating
them their preferred locations. As compared to the mid 80% exam performers,
the log of relative risk ratio is 1.6 times higher for bottom 10% exam
performers, to be allocated a non-competitive but preferred position, relative
to the base. The effect reverses for the mid 80% and top 10% exam performers.
This suggests that, relative to other types, bottom 10% exam performers are
allocated positions they prefer when there is less aggregate preference for the
location. Considering locations that are competitive & not-preferred, relative
to the mid 80%, the log of relative risk ratio is 2 times lower for the bottom
10% exam performers to be allocated such positions, as compared to the base.
A test of similarity of the effect for non-competitive & preferred job versus
competitive & not-preferred location for bottom 10% exam performers has a
p-value of 0.01. This suggests that the low types are allocated locations of their
preference. Relative to the base, the log of relative risk ratio is also 0.17 times
higher for bottom 10% to get a competitive & preferred location. However, the
p-value is 0.78.
These results suggest that the organization panders to the bottom 10%
when allocating job locations. If meritocracy is defined as the allocation of
preferred jobs or important jobs by ability, it appears that the organization
does not allocate jobs meritocratically. The bottom 10% exam performers are
given their preferred job locations while the mid and top performers are less
likely to be allocated such positions.
In the next chapter, performance implications of such a system of allo-
cations is explored. I look at tax performance of different exam performing
juniors in competitive/preferred jobs. These are simple correlations and not
causal effects. The aim is to shed light on whether there is a trade-off between
meritocratic and efficient allocations.
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Table 6.2: Multinomial logit: Allocations on average
Base category: not in competitive
or preferred location
(tax collection jobs)
working in working in working in
non-competitive competitive competitive
& & not &
preferred preferred preferred
job job job
Exam Top 10% (α) -0.12 -0.21 0.60
[0.90] [0.76] [0.56]
Exam Bottom 10% (β) 1.64* -2.11* 0.17
[0.08] [0.08] [0.78]
Constant -1.87** -0.06 -0.53
[0.01] [0.84] [0.24]
α=β (p-value) 0.32 0.18 0.60
Controls No
Cohort & time FE No
person x mon 1403
Cohorts 10
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cameron Gelbach & Miller (2008) cluster bootstrap-t p-values in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on
one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively. At the
end of training PAS bureaucrats are asked to list their preferred job location from first to fourth most preferred. A
location is preferred if it has ever been categorized as a preferred one by a bureaucrat. Preferred location is a dummy
that turns on 1 whenever a junior is working as a tax collector, in a job location that he or she prefers. Competitive
location is defined as a dummy that turns on 1 if demand for the location is in the top 25% of total demand for any
location.
6.3 What is the tax performance of different types
of juniors in competitive vs. preferred jobs?
Tax data described in section 2.2 of chapter 2, is used to investigate the
performance of juniors in competitive/preferred jobs. Tax performance
measure used in this subsection is :
Tax per f ormance =
Tax collected in a month
Annual tax target
(6.6)
The following OLS regression is implemented:
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Taxict = pi + µ Examic + φ Pre f erredict+
ρ Competitiveict + η Pre f erredict × Competitiveict
ν Pre f erredict × Examic + χ Competitiveict × Examic
+ τ Pre f erredict × Competitiveict × Examic + eict (6.7)
where Taxict is the tax performance of junior i, in cohort c, month-year
t. Examic are dummy variables that turn on 1 for those juniors that are in
the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam, respectively.
Preferred job location is a dummy that turns on 1 whenever a junior is working
in a job location that he or she prefers. Competitiveness of job location is the
competitiveness index of the job location that the junior is working in. Error
term is clustered at the cohort level. As before, owing to the small number of
cohorts, Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) bootstrap-t p-values are reported
in parenthesis. This is implemented using the boottest command in STATA
(Roodman et al. (2019)).
Results: What is the tax performance of different types of
juniors in competitive vs. preferred jobs?
Table 6.3 reports results. Column (1) shows results without interacting with
exam. Juniors that work in locations that are preferred and for which there is
competition, have a 6% higher tax performance, than those that work in non-
competitive & not-preferred locations. However, the p-value is 0.41 and the
effect is not statistically significant. On average, relative to the base, juniors
that work in competitive & not preferred locations and non-competitive &
preferred locations, have a lower tax collection, but the effect is not statistically
significant.
Table 6.3, column (2) presents a more interesting picture. For all types of
juniors, performance is positive in locations that are preferred and for which
there is competition. The competition from other bureaucrats keeps these
juniors performing well, since a poor performer is very likely to be replaced
by another competing junior. This is in keeping with what has been shown by
Khan et al. (2018).
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Table 6.3: What is the performance of juniors in competitive, preferred
locations?
Dependent variable:
Tax performance (%)
(1) (2)
Exam Mid 80%
Competitive job -0.52 0.28
[0.85] [0.86]
Preferred job -2.76 -4.01*
[0.42] [0.08]
Competitive job × Preferred job 6.05 13.32*
[0.41] [0.05]
Exam Top 10%
Competitive job × Exam Top 10% (θ) -5.81*
[0.31]
Preferred job × Exam Top 10% (α) -11.87
[0.56]
Preferred job × Competitive job × Exam Top 10% (β) 2.05
[0.83]
Exam Bottom 10%
Competitive job × Exam Bottom 10% (λ) -47.73*
[0.06]
Preferred job × Exam Bottom 10% (φ) 11.55+
[0.11]
Preferred job × Competitive job × Exam Bottom 10% (κ) 19.70
[0.67]
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.63
Ho: φ=κ (p-value) 0.88
Ho: θ=β (p-value) 0.41
Ho: λ=κ (p-value) 0.28
Ho: α=φ (p-value) 0.27
Ho: θ=λ (p-value) 0.09
Ho: β=κ (p-value) 0.59
Controls Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes
Mean 8.16 7.92
person x mon 476 441
Cohorts 10 9
+ p<0.12,* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) cluster bootstrap-t procedure
p-values in parentheses (999 replications).
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn
on one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively. At
the end of training PAS bureaucrats are asked to list their preferred job location from first to fourth most preferred.
A location is preferred if it has ever been categorized as a preferred one by a bureaucrat. Preferred location is a
dummy that turns on 1 whenever a junior is working as a tax collector, in a job location that he or she prefers.
Competitive location is the index of competitiveness of a location that the junior works in. Tax performance is tax
collected in a month as a percentage of annual tax target set by the central revenue agency i.e. Board of Revenue (BOR).
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In locations that are preferred but not high in demand, mid 80% collect
4% less taxes than locations that are neither preferred, nor competitive. The
differential effect for top 10% exam performers is 12% more negative than mid
80, but it is not statistically significant. The p-value is 0.56. On the other hand,
relative to the base category, allocating a non-competitive & preferred location
is associated with nearly 12% more tax collection by the bottom 10% exam
performers. The effect is nearly significant with a p-value of 0.11. The mean of
tax performance is 7.92% and so this is an economically significant difference
in performance. At the bottom of the table, a test of α = φ has a p-value of
0.27. This suggests that low type juniors are more likely to perform better
in non-competitive positions if their preferences are accommodated, implying
that ability and preferences are substitutes.
Next I consider the performance effect of working in competitive job
location that is not preferred by juniors. Allocating a bottom exam performing
junior to a competitive location, which they don’t prefer, leads to a much larger
reduction in their tax collection (48%) than mid 80%. On the other hand, the
negative differential effect is much smaller for top 10% exam performers (6%).
Both the effects are marginally significant and a test of θ = λ has a p-value
of 0.09. This suggests that everyone performs poorly when allocated a non-
preferred, but competitive location. However, the fall in performance of bottom
10% exam performers is much higher than that of mid 80% or top 10% exam
performers. Therefore, if anyone has to be moved out of such locations, it
should be the bottom 10%. This descriptive evidence, together with those in
section 6.2, suggests that non-meritocratic allocations might not be as bad for
performance. And these are exactly the kind of allocation we see on average
in table 6.2.
In the next subsection, I consider the allocations of juniors across com-
petitive vs. preferred jobs at the discretion of seniors. This will shed light
on whether and by how much a discretionary system is meritocratic and the
resulting tension between meritocratic and efficient allocations.
6.4 What type of juniors are allocated competitive
vs. preferred jobs by seniors?
A system can be considered meritocratic if juniors with higher ability are
accommodated when it comes to allocating preferred job locations. One can
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also think of the system being meritocratic if positions that are competitive and
sought after are also allocated by ability. While a meritocratic system is lauded
in general, results from table 6.3 suggest that meritocratic allocations might not
be the best way.
In order to understand the system under discretion, in this subsection I ask
what type of juniors are allocated competitive versus preferred jobs by seniors.
Attention is again restricted to tax collection jobs. The following multinomial
logit estimation is implemented:
ln
P(Cict = j)
P(Cict = J)
= µcj + µtj +γjExamic +pijPowerct + αjPowerct× Exam top 10ic
+ β jPowerct × Exam bottom 10ic + θjXict (6.8)
where
• j=1 if junior i, in cohort c and month-year t starts work in a non-
competitive & not preferred job location (base category)
• j=2 if junior i, in cohort c and month-year t starts work in a non-
competitive & preferred job location
• j=3 if junior i, in cohort c and month-year t starts work in a competitive
& not preferred job location
as an Assistant Commissioner (tax collector). Working in a competitive
job location is a dummy that turns on 1 if demand for the job location of the
junior is in the top 25% of demand for any location. Preferred job location is
characterized as a dummy that turns on 1, whenever a junior is working in a
job location that he or she prefers. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy
variables that turn on 1 for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10%
of their cohort in the recruitment exam, respectively. Power of seniors (Power)
is the average official rank of seniors of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats that
they work with in their first job. I report reduced form results using power
of potential seniors (Powerp). This is defined as the average rule-based rank
of potential seniors that junior bureaucrats could have worked with in their
first job. Error is clustered at the cohort level. As before, owing to the small
number of cohorts with preference data, Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008)
bootstrap-t p-values are reported in parenthesis. These are implemented using
the boottest command in STATA (Roodman et al. (2019)).
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Results: What type of juniors are allocated competitive vs.
preferred jobs by seniors?
Table 6.4 presents reduced form results, while table 6.5 reports IV results,
using a control function approach. The control function was implemented
following standard techniques suggested by Petrin & Train (2010) and Imbens
& Wooldridge (2007). Table 6.6 reports results using Power that does not
account for any potential endogeneity of power of seniors.
It appears that, unlike the allocations seen in tables 6.1 and 6.2, seniors
accommodate top 10%, rather than bottom 10% exam performers. In table 6.4,
relative to the base category, with an above average increase in the power of
potential seniors, the log of relative risk ratio is 9 times lower for top 10% exam
performers to be allocated a job location which is competitive & not-preferred
by them. On the other hand, with an increase in power of potential seniors, the
log of relative risk ratio is 2 times higher for top 10% exam performers to be
allocated a location that is both competitive and preferred by them (relative to
the base). However, this effect is not significant and the p-value is 0.58. A test
of these two interaction effects for the top 10% exam performers has a p-value
of 0.05, suggesting that the the preferences of the top exam performers are kept
in view for competitive locations.
The IV effects in table 6.5 are much larger. Relative to the base category,
with a one rank above average increase in the power of seniors, the log of
relative risk ratio is 56 times lower for the top 10% exam performers to work
in competitive jobs that they don’t prefer. The effect is significant and also
statistically different from the positive effect on working in competitive and
preferred positions. An F-test of the interaction effects for top 10% exam
performers, across columns (3) and (4) has a p-value of 0.02.
Moreover, results in column (3) of table 6.5 suggest that relative to the base
category, with an above average increase in the power of seniors, the log of
relative risk ratio is 19 times lower for bottom 10% exam performers to work in
a competitive and preferred position. A test of α = β at the bottom of the table
has a p-value of 0.03, suggesting that this negative effect is different from the
positive effect for the top 10% exam performers. The effect is not significant in
reduced form.
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Table 6.4: Multinomial logit: Do seniors improve allocations?
Base category: not in competitive
or preferred location
(tax collection jobs)
working in working in working in
non-competitive competitive competitive
& & not &
preferred preferred preferred
job job job
Reduced form
Powerp -10.69 -5.33 5.32
[0.42] [0.85] [0.52]
Exam Top 10% -0.49 -0.22 0.07
[0.76] [0.79] [0.93]
Exam Bottom 10% 1.00 -2.44 0.09
[0.44] [0.16] [0.93]
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) -1.39 -9.43** 2.34
[0.65] [0.03] [0.58]
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% (β) 0.36 1.00 -9.34
[0.80] [0.84] [0.42]
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.69 0.15 0.20
Controls Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes
person x mon 1232
Cohorts 10
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cameron Gelbach & Miller (2008) cluster bootstrap-t p-values in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on
one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively. At the
end of training PAS bureaucrats are asked to list their preferred job location from first to fourth most preferred. A
location is preferred if it has ever been categorized as a preferred one by a bureaucrat. Preferred location is a dummy
that turns on 1 whenever a junior is working as a tax collector, in a job location that he or she prefers. Competitive
location is defined as a dummy that turns on 1 if demand for the location is in the top 25% of total demand for any
location. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based rank of potential seniors that junior bureaucrats
could have worked with in their first job.
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Table 6.5: Multinomial logit: Do seniors improve allocations?
Base category: not in competitive
or preferred location
(tax collection jobs)
working in working in working in
non-competitive competitive competitive
& & not &
preferred preferred preferred
job job job
IV-control function
Power -26.31 6.62 11.36
[0.34] [0.70] [0.64]
Exam Top 10% -0.62 -0.31 0.09
[0.71] [0.68] [0.92]
Exam Bottom 10% 1.07 -2.83 0.18
[0.44] [0.12] [0.84]
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) -16.93 -55.59* 15.08
[0.25] [0.09] [0.38]
Power × Exam Bottom 10% (β) 5.21 20.52 -18.60*
[0.71] [0.38] [0.09]
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.15 0.01 0.03
Controls Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes
person x mon 1232
Cohorts 10
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cameron Gelbach & Miller (2008) cluster bootstrap-t p-values in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on
one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively. At the
end of training PAS bureaucrats are asked to list their preferred job location from first to fourth most preferred. A
location is preferred if it has ever been categorized as a preferred one by a bureaucrat. Preferred location is a dummy
that turns on 1 whenever a junior is working as a tax collector, in a job location that he or she prefers. Competitive
location is defined as a dummy that turns on 1 if demand for the location is in the top 25% of total demand for
any location. Power of seniors (Power) is the average official rank, over time, of seniors that newly recruited PAS
bureaucrats worked with in their first job.
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Table 6.6: Multinomial logit: Do seniors improve allocations?
Base category: not in competitive
or preferred location
(tax collection jobs)
working in working in working in
non-competitive competitive competitive
& & not &
preferred preferred preferred
job job job
Power -6.87 15.78 0.69
[0.78] [0.33] [0.93]
Exam Top 10% -0.57 -0.19 0.21
[0.77] [0.90] [0.77]
Exam Bottom 10% 1.36 -2.68* 0.21
[0.35] [0.07] [0.76]
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) 4.12 -12.32 -4.34
[0.83] [0.14] [0.38]
Power × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -2.82 18.34 -9.85
[0.56] [0.71] [0.47]
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.64 0.23 0.51
Controls Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes
person x mon 1232
Cohorts 10
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cameron Gelbach & Miller (2008) cluster bootstrap-t p-values in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on
one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively. At the
end of training PAS bureaucrats are asked to list their preferred job location from first to fourth most preferred. A
location is preferred if it has ever been categorized as a preferred one by a bureaucrat. Preferred location is a dummy
that turns on 1 whenever a junior is working as a tax collector, in a job location that he or she prefers. Competitive
location is defined as a dummy that turns on 1 if demand for the location is in the top 25% of total demand for
any location. Power of seniors (Power) is the average official rank, over time, of seniors that newly recruited PAS
bureaucrats worked with in their first job.
In column (1) of table 6.5, results show that when it comes to allocating
non-competitive jobs that are preferred, the log of relative risk ratio is 17 times
lower for the top 10% exam performers to be allocated such a job (relative
to the base). But the effect is not significant and the p-value is 0.25. The
effect reverses for the bottom 10%. Relative to the base, with a one rank above
average increase in power of seniors, the log of relative risk ratio is 5 times
higher for the bottom 10% to be allocated a job that is non-competitive &
preferred. However, the p-value is 0.71 and the effect is not significant. A
test of the interaction effects for the bottom 10% across columns (2) and (4)
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has a p-value of zero, suggesting that while bottom 10% can be catered to for
jobs that are not competitive, this is not the case for competitive jobs. Reduced
form results in table 6.4 are similar.
On the whole, the organization carries out non-meritocratic allocations. On
the other hand discretionary allocations by seniors are meritocratic. It is not
obvious that this is the best way to allocate heterogeneous jobs laterally. Results
in table 6.3, show that there is a tension between meritocracy and efficiency.
Public sector bureaucracies, with job security for workers, might do better by
considering the preferences of the low types in lateral allocations.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
“strong institutions......are essential to effective development. Well
executed policies that are slightly misguided are much more
effective than absolutely correct but poorly executed ones.” (Larry
Summers in Besley & Zagha (2005) p.7)
State institutions and the bureaucrats that execute policy are increasingly
seen as a key determinant of economic development (Besley & Persson (2009);
Besley & Persson (2010)). By studying the promotions and lateral allocations
of civil servants that design and implement policy for 110 million people,
this thesis contributes to the rapidly expanding literature on organization
economics of the state.
This study speaks to the debates on rules versus discretion in bureaucra-
cies. By showing that discretionary allocations by seniors are meritocratic,
it challenges the centuries old wisdom on bureaucracies. The thesis argues
that while there might not be a universal answer to the question of discretion,
giving center stage to the incentives of the person exercising discretion are key
for meritocracy.
This thesis opens up further questions surrounding efficiency of discre-
tionary allocations. This is not straight forward to answer. First, it needs a
deep investigation of the senior-junior pair working in a team. Is there positive
assortative matching on traits? What happens to the performance of the team
that loses a high type junior to the senior with more power? What about
direct learning spillovers from seniors? And the resultant career incentives that
discretion of the seniors can generate. Another equally important aspect would
be to understand the corruption aspect of these allocations. Is it that seniors
pull up the high type juniors into their team so that they could together engage
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in effective rent extraction? What is the effect on the senior’s performance of
working with a high type junior? Does it allow the senior to reduce effort?
A first step in this direction was taken in chapter 6. Result in this chapter
highlight the tension between meritocracy and efficiency. While senior allocate
lateral jobs meritocratically, this might not be the most efficient allocation.
A system that is, in fact, not meritocratic is closer to efficiency. This is
because bottom 10% exam performers perform better when allocated non-
competitive positions that they prefer, while they perform worse than others
when allocated competitive positions that they do not prefer.
In organizations where the force of competition drives out the low types,
this trade-off appears less important. However, in bureaucratic organizations,
with job security for life and with low exit of workers, this trade-off is
potentially significant.1 In these organizations, allocations through seniors
might need to be combined with other kinds of allocation policies to ensure
that the low types are incentivized to perform.
The thesis shows how meritocracy and the feeling that ‘it is not what you
know but who you know’ can co-exist. While high merit juniors with powerful
seniors get better allocations, those not as highly connected do not. A simple
policy like job rotation of juniors, can go a long way in ensuring that seniors
promote meritocratically from within the larger pool of juniors.
Further work would also need to investigate whether junior workers
promoted through discretion of seniors, perform better after being promoted.
Various interpretations of the Peter Principle suggest that workers who are
good in one job are not necessarily good in the job into which they are
promoted (Lazear (2004) and Benson et al. (2018)). However, given the amount
of time seniors and juniors spend together, it is quite possible that seniors can
observe the more permanent and job relevant component of ability of junior
workers. Allowing discretion to seniors could help organizations promote on
the basis of this information, potentially avoiding pitfalls of the Peter Principle.
These ideas needs further investigation.
1In the PAS bureaucracy not even 2% of civil servants exit.
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Table A.1: OLS - Do seniors promote meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam :
Top5% Top6% Top7% Top8% Top9% Top10% Top11% Top12% Top13% Top14% Top15%
Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam :
Bot5% Bot6% Bot7% Bot8% Bot9% Bot10% Bot11% Bot12% Bot13% Bot14% Bot15%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Power -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Exam -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Exam 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Power × Exam 0.14** 0.14** 0.13* 0.13* 0.13* 0.13* 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Power × Exam 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
person x mon 17229 17229 17229 17229 17229 17229 17229 17229 17229 17229 17229
Cohorts 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average seniority of first seniors of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats
that they work with in the first month of the first job. It is measured as the average official promotions, over time, of the set of seniors. Fast-track promotions
are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the
actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Exam is as defined at the top of each column. As we move from left to right, it is a
dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top 10% to 50% of their cohort in the recruitment exam, respectively. Mean is mean value for the
outcome variable in the estimation sample. Experience, experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy
for whether the job is in the field offices is included. Cohort & month-year FE included in all specifications. All specifications exclude first job.
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Table A.2: Reduced form - Do seniors promote meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam :
Top5% Top6% Top7% Top8% Top9% Top10% Top11% Top12% Top13% Top14% Top15%
Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam :
Bot5% Bot6% Bot7% Bot8% Bot9% Bot10% Bot11% Bot12% Bot13% Bot14% Bot15%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Powerp -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Exam -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Exam 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Powerp × Exam 0.08+ 0.08+ 0.08+ 0.09* 0.08* 0.09* 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10* 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Powerp × Exam 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
person x mon 17411 17411 17411 17411 17411 17411 17411 17411 17411 17411 17411
Cohorts 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
+ p<0.12, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based seniority, over time, of the first set of
potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil
servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his
or her official rank. Exam is as defined at the top of each column. As we move from left to right, it is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that
were the top 10% to 50% of their cohort in the recruitment exam, respectively. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample. Experience,
experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy for whether the job is in the field offices is included.
Cohort & month-year FE included in all specifications. All specifications exclude first job.
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Table A.3: Second stage - Do seniors promote meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam :
Top5% Top6% Top7% Top8% Top9% Top10% Top11% Top12% Top13% Top14% Top15%
Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam :
Bot5% Bot6% Bot7% Bot8% Bot9% Bot10% Bot11% Bot12% Bot13% Bot14% Bot15%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Power -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Exam -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Exam 0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Power × Exam 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13+ 0.13+ 0.14* 0.15* 0.15* 0.15* 0.14* 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Power × Exam 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
person x mon 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166
Cohorts 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
+ p<0.13, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average seniority of first seniors of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats
that they work with in the first month of the first job. It is measured as the average official promotions, over time, of the set of seniors. Fast-track promotions
are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the
actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Exam is as defined at the top of each column. As we move from left to right, it is a
dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top 10% to 50% of their cohort in the recruitment exam, respectively. Mean is mean value for the
outcome variable in the estimation sample. Experience, experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy
for whether the job is in the field offices is included. Cohort & month-year FE included in all specifications. All specifications exclude first job.
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Table A.4: First stage - Do seniors promote meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam :
Top5% Top6% Top7% Top8% Top9% Top10% Top11% Top12% Top13% Top14% Top15%
Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam : Exam :
Bot5% Bot6% Bot7% Bot8% Bot9% Bot10% Bot11% Bot12% Bot13% Bot14% Bot15%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Powerp 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.54***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Exam -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Exam 0.08* 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.09***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Powerp × Exam -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06)
Powerp × Exam 0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
AP F Statistic-I 42 48 48 49 56 54 53 52 48 48 46
AP F Statistic-II 112 103 109 123 127 139 143 143 135 147 264
AP F Statistic-III 302 305 304 270 312 414 420 418 558 626 527
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
person x mon 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166
Cohorts 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average seniority of first seniors of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats
that they work with in the first month of the first job. It is measured as the average official promotions, over time, of the set of seniors. Fast-track promotions
are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the
actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Exam is as defined at the top of each column. As we move from left to right, it is a
dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top 10% to 50% of their cohort in the recruitment exam, respectively. Mean is mean value for the
outcome variable in the estimation sample. Experience, experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy
for whether the job is in the field offices is included. Cohort & month-year FE included in all specifications. All specifications exclude first job.
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Table A.5: OLS - Do seniors promote meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
Exam = Exam = Exam = Exam = Exam =
Top 10% Top 20% Top 30% Top 40% Top 50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Power -0.047 -0.041 -0.051 -0.048 -0.010
(0.043) (0.044) (0.050) (0.053) (0.048)
Power × Exam 0.136** 0.049 0.036 0.032 -0.027
(0.067) (0.063) (0.043) (0.044) (0.048)
Exam -0.004 -0.002 -0.017 -0.004 0.008
(0.037) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
person x mon 17229 17229 17229 17229 17229
Cohorts 39 39 39 39 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average seniority of first seniors
of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats that they work with in the first month of the first job. It is measured as the average
official promotions, over time, of the set of seniors. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior
civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank
of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Exam is as defined at the top of each column. As we move
from left to right, it is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top 10% to 50% of their cohort in
the recruitment exam, respectively. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample. Experience,
experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy for whether the
job is in the field offices is included. Cohort & month-year FE included in all specifications. All specifications exclude first
job.
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Table A.6: Reduced form - Do seniors promote meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
Exam = Exam = Exam = Exam = Exam =
Top 10% Top 20% Top 30% Top 40% Top 50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Powerp -0.050 -0.048 -0.061 -0.056 -0.038
(0.051) (0.053) (0.056) (0.058) (0.053)
Powerp × Exam 0.094* 0.031 0.040 0.033 -0.004
(0.049) (0.049) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040)
Exam -0.013 -0.006 -0.022 -0.008 0.004
(0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
person x mon 17411 17411 17411 17411 17411
Cohorts 39 39 39 39 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based
seniority, over time, of the first set of potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job.
Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province.
It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her
official rank. Exam is as defined at the top of each column. As we move from left to right, it is a dummy that turns on
one for those civil servants that were the top 10% to 50% of their cohort in the recruitment exam, respectively. Mean is
mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample. Experience, experience squared of the new recruit, time
trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy for whether the job is in the field offices is included. Cohort &
month-year FE included in all specifications. All specifications exclude first job.
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Table A.7: Second Stage - Do seniors promote meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
Exam = Exam = Exam = Exam = Exam =
Top 10% Top 20% Top 30% Top 40% Top 50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Power -0.111 -0.114 -0.134 -0.126 -0.104
(0.093) (0.097) (0.104) (0.106) (0.096)
Power × Exam 0.137* 0.035 0.056 0.048 0.002
(0.080) (0.071) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051)
Exam -0.013 -0.013 -0.026 -0.012 -0.002
(0.037) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
person x mon 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166
Cohorts 39 39 39 39 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average seniority of first seniors
of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats that they work with in the first month of the first job. It is measured as the average
official promotions, over time, of the set of seniors. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior
civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank
of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Exam is as defined at the top of each column. As we move
from left to right, it is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top 10% to 50% of their cohort in
the recruitment exam, respectively. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample. Experience,
experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy for whether the
job is in the field offices is included. Cohort & month-year FE included in all specifications. All specifications exclude first
job.
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Table A.8: First Stage - Do seniors promote meritocratically?
Dependent variable:
Promotion power of seniors (Power)
Exam = Exam = Exam = Exam = Exam =
Top 10% Top 20% Top 30% Top 40% Top 50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Powerp 0.547*** 0.543*** 0.531*** 0.530*** 0.524***
(0.087) (0.089) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094)
Powerp × Exam -0.104 -0.048 -0.007 -0.000 0.011
(0.098) (0.053) (0.048) (0.047) (0.035)
Exam -0.033 -0.041 -0.040 -0.038 -0.032
(0.037) (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.022)
AP F Statistic-I 45 38 35 35 35
AP F Statistic-II 99 177 246 280 404
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
person x mon 17166 17166 17166 17166 17166
Cohorts 39 39 39 39 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average seniority of first seniors
of newly recruited PAS bureaucrats that they work with in the first month of the first job. It is measured as the average
official promotions, over time, of the set of seniors. Fast-track promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior
civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank
of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Exam is as defined at the top of each column. As we move
from left to right, it is a dummy that turns on one for those civil servants that were the top 10% to 50% of their cohort in
the recruitment exam, respectively. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample. Experience,
experience squared of the new recruit, time trend of the first job, official rank of the junior and dummy for whether the
job is in the field offices is included. Cohort & month-year FE included in all specifications. All specifications exclude first
job.
Table A.9: Correlation between end of training and vacancies
Dependent variable: Vacancies
All districts Large districts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Training end 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tehsil FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1173784 1173784 387492 387492
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Note: The unit of observation is a tehsil-month. Training end (dummy) turns on 1 a day before the end of on-the-job
training of newly recruited civil servants. It stays zero otherwise. Vacancy is a dummy that turns on 1 whenever the
position is vacant in a tehsil. It remains zero otherwise. Large districts include Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Gujranwala,
Faisalabad, Sargodha, Bahawalpur and Sialkot. Standard errors are clustered at the tehsil level.
Table A.10: Correlation between end of training and vacancies
Dependent variable: Vacancies
All districts Large districts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Training end -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tehsil FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1173784 1173784 387492 387492
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a tehsil-month. Training end (dummy) turns on 1 a month before the end of on-the-job
training of newly recruited civil servants. It stays zero otherwise. Vacancy is a dummy that turns on 1 whenever the
position is vacant in a tehsil. It remains zero otherwise. Large districts include Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Gujranwala,
Faisalabad, Sargodha, Bahawalpur and Sialkot. Standard errors are clustered at the tehsil level.
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Table A.11: Correlation between district characteristics, vacancies and tenure
Dependent variable:
Vacancies Tenure
(% per year) (days per year)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Districts with large cities 1.638 6.939 -188.110** 398.320
(1.394) (25.704) (79.934) (674.876)
Real wage (Rs.) 0.027 0.062 0.734 0.154
(0.034) (0.046) (0.770) (0.994)
Population -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Literacy (%) -0.039 -0.066 0.217 -0.503
(0.062) (0.076) (2.601) (3.966)
Rural employment (%) -0.006 -0.066 -0.945 0.995
(0.054) (0.081) (2.290) (2.372)
Number of hospitals 0.080 -0.922 11.576 -28.166
(0.228) (0.887) (10.084) (55.007)
Number of Rural Health Centers -0.044 0.058 0.756 16.330
(0.124) (0.437) (7.137) (20.036)
New electricity connections -0.031 -0.037 1.774* -0.002
(0.044) (0.064) (1.024) (2.908)
Number of primary schools -0.001 0.002 0.092 -0.139
(0.001) (0.006) (0.077) (0.296)
Primary school enrolment 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Terrorist attack (dummy) 0.657 0.748 -2.959 -16.524
(1.530) (2.166) (37.311) (46.020)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 167 167 167 167
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a district-year from 2005-2009. AC vacancy is defined as a percentage of time in a year
that AC position remained vacant in a given district. AC tenure is days spent at an AC job on average. Districts with large
cities include Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Sargodha, Bahawalpur and Sialkot. The provincial
capital is Lahore. Data on all variables except terrorism is from the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. Terrorist attacks data is
from the Global Terrorism Data-set. Fiscal yr FE and district FE are included in column (2) and (4). Standard errors are
clustered at the district level.
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Table A.12: Are tax targets determined by power of seniors?
Tax Targets
(Rs. in million)
(1) (2)
Powerp 0.05 -1.09
(2.99) (3.33)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.37
(4.08)
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -3.01
(3.53)
Exam Top 10% -0.85
(2.86)
Exam Bottom 10% 1.41
(2.43)
mean 9.00 9.41
person x mon 1483 1297
cohorts 31 30
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil-servant month. Tax target is the annual target (in rupees) for the Assistant
Commissioners in a tehsil. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based rank of potential seniors
that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Exam top (bottom) 10% is a dummy that
turns on one for those civil servants that were the top (bottom) 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam. The
omitted category is mid 80% exam performers. Standard errors are clustered at the cohort level.
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Table A.13: Determinants of tax targets
Tax Target
(Rs. in million)
(1) (2)
Past tax collection -0.029 0.022
(0.121) (0.200)
Election year 0.346 6.574
(3.749) (5.489)
Real wage -0.008 0.006
(0.048) (0.058)
Population estimates -0.912* -7.281
(0.523) (6.464)
Rural employment 0.439** 0.529
(0.216) (0.375)
Agriculture production 0.355*** 1.341***
(0.127) (0.356)
Irrigated area 0.026*** 0.047***
(0.005) (0.018)
year FE Yes Yes
district FE No Yes
Observations 121 121
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a district-fiscal year. Tax target is the annual target (in rupees) set by the BOR
for the Assistant Commissioners in tehsils. Election year is a dummy that turns on one in election years. Data
on past tax collection has been digitized from records of BOR. Data on rest of the independent variables is from
the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.
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Table A.14: First stage - Do seniors use pvt. info meritocratically?
Dependent variable:
Promotion power of seniors
(power)
(1) (2)
Powerp 0.70*** 0.68***
(0.08) (0.11)
Powerp × Tax Top 10% (γ) 0.09** 0.09
(0.04) (0.07)
Tax Top 10% -0.03 -0.05***
(0.02) (0.01)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.05
(0.06)
Exam Top 10% 0.04**
(0.02)
AP F Statistic-I 88 55
AP F Statistic-II 945 709
AP F Statistic-III 69
Controls Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes
person x mon 6673 5668
Cohorts 29 29
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average official rank of seniors of
newly recruited PAS bureaucrats with whom they work with in their first job. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the
average rule-based rank of potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Fast-track
promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined
as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank. Tax
top 10% is a dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top 10% of the cohort in tax collection. Exam top
10% is a dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top 10% of the cohort in recruitment exam. Angrist &
Pischke (2009) f-stat is reported for each endogenous variable at the bottom. Mean is mean value for the outcome variable
in the estimation sample. Cohort & month-year FE, experience of the new recruit, time trend of the first job and official
rank of the junior is included. All specifications exclude first job.
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Table A.15: Second stage - Do seniors use pvt. info meritocratically?
Dependent variable: Fast-track promotions
(second job onward)
OLS IV Reduced Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Power (θ) 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
(0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (0.17)
Power × Tax Top 10% (γ) -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.02
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
Tax Top 10% -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.27 0.50***
(0.19) (0.13)
Exam Top10% -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Powerp (θ) -0.01 -0.03
(0.10) (0.12)
Powerp × Tax Top 10% (γ) -0.05 0.01
(0.06) (0.08)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.37***
(0.12)
Ho: γ=α (p-value) 0.27 0.00 0.03
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.35
person x mon 6673 5668 6673 5668 6706 5701
Cohorts 29 29 29 29 29 29
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Power of seniors (Power) is the average official rank of seniors of
newly recruited PAS bureaucrats with whom they work with in their first job. Power of potential seniors (Powerp) is the
average rule-based rank of potential seniors that junior PAS bureaucrats could have worked with in the first job. Fast-track
promotions are promotions at the discretion of the senior civil servants and the chief executive of the province. It is defined
as a dummy that turns on one whenever the actual rank of the junior bureaucrat is higher than his or her official rank.
Tax top 10% is a dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top 10% of the cohort in tax collection. Exam
top 10% is a dummy that turns on one when the civil servant is in the top 10% of the cohort in recruitment exam. Mean
is mean value for the outcome variable in the estimation sample. Cohort & month-year FE, experience of the new recruit,
time trend of the first job and official rank of the junior is included. All specifications exclude first job.
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Table A.16: OLS - Do seniors improve lateral allocations?
Dependent variable:
Competitive job location
(Tax collection job)
(1) (2)
Power 0.13 0.35
(0.10) (0.21)
Exam Top 10% 0.04
(0.07)
Exam Bottom 10% -0.08
(0.05)
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.08
(0.31)
Power × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -0.65***
(0.22)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.02
Controls No Yes
Cohort & time FE No Yes
Mean 0.33 0.34
person x mon 7378 5638
cohorts 44 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn
on one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively.
Competitiveness job location is the index is competitiveness of the location that junior works in. The index is defined
as demand for the job location as a proportion of maximum demand for any location. Power of seniors (Power) is the
average official rank, over time, of seniors that newly recruited PAS bureaucrats work with in their first job.
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Table A.17: Reduced form - Do seniors improve lateral allocations?
Dependent variable:
Competitive job location
(Tax collection job)
(1) (2)
Powerp 0.09 0.19
(0.07) (0.27)
Exam Top 10% 0.04
(0.07)
Exam Bottom 10% -0.08
(0.05)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.03
(0.19)
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -0.46**
(0.20)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.05
Controls No Yes
Cohort & time FE No Yes
Mean 0.33 0.34
person x mon 7376 5640
Cohorts 43 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn
on one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively.
Competitiveness job location is the index is competitiveness of the location that junior works in. The index is defined
as demand for the job location as a proportion of maximum demand for any location. Power of potential seniors
(Powerp) is the average rule-based rank, over time, of potential seniors that junior bureaucrats could have worked
with in their first job.
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Table A.18: Do seniors improve lateral allocations?
Dependent variable:
Competitive job location
(Tax collection job)
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power 0.13 0.35 0.16 0.49
(0.10) (0.21) (0.13) (0.56)
Exam Top 10% 0.04 0.04
(0.07) (0.07)
Exam Bottom 10% -0.08 -0.08
(0.05) (0.05)
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.08 0.34
(0.31) (0.78)
Power × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -0.65*** -0.83*
(0.22) (0.44)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.02 0.20
Controls No Yes No Yes
Cohort & time FE No Yes No Yes
Mean 0 0 0 0
person x mon 7378 5638 7374 5638
Cohorts 44 39 43 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn
on one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively.
Competitiveness job location is the index is competitiveness of the location that junior works in. The index is defined
as demand for the job location as a proportion of maximum demand for any location. Power of seniors (Power) is the
average official rank, over time, of seniors that newly recruited PAS bureaucrats work with in their first job.
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Table A.19: First stage - Do seniors improve lateral allocations? (tax collection
job)
Dependent variable:
Promotion power of work ties
(power)
(1) (2)
Powerp 0.55*** 0.56***
(0.10) (0.08)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) -0.13**
(0.06)
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% (β) 0.23***
(0.07)
Exam Top 10% -0.00
(0.00)
Exam Bottom 10% 0.00
(0.00)
AP F Statistic-I 32 45
AP F Statistic-II 9
AP F Statistic-III 234
Controls No Yes
Cohort & time FE No Yes
person x mon 7374 5638
Cohorts 43 39
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn
on one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively.
Competitiveness job location is the index is competitiveness of the location that junior works in. The index is defined
as demand for the job location as a proportion of maximum demand for any location. Power of seniors (Power) is the
average official rank, over time, of seniors that newly recruited PAS bureaucrats work with in their first job. Power of
potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based rank, over time, of potential seniors that junior bureaucrats could
have worked with in their first job.
130
Table A.20: OLS - Do seniors improve lateral allocations?
Dependent variable:
Preferred job location
(Tax collection job)
(1) (2)
Power 0.75** -1.01
(0.24) (0.64)
Exam Top 10% 0.03
(0.27)
Exam Bottom 10% 0.23**
(0.07)
Power × Exam Top 10% (α) 0.66
(0.74)
Power × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -1.22
(0.79)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.13
Controls No Yes
Cohort & time FE No Yes
Mean 0.37 0.34
person x mon 1456 1199
cohorts 10 10
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on
one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively. At the
end of training PAS bureaucrats are asked to list their preferred job location from first to fourth most preferred. A
location is preferred if it has ever been categorized as a preferred one by a bureaucrat. Preferred location is a dummy
that turns on 1 whenever a junior is working as a tax collector, in a job location that he or she prefers.Power of seniors
(Power) is the average official rank, over time, of seniors that newly recruited PAS bureaucrats work with in their first
job.
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Table A.21: Reduced form - Do seniors improve lateral allocations?
Dependent variable:
Preferred job location
(Tax collection job)
(1) (2)
Powerp 0.13 0.55
(0.30) (0.57)
Exam Top 10% 0.04
(0.26)
Exam Bottom 10% 0.22**
(0.08)
Powerp × Exam Top 10% (α) 1.06***
(0.26)
Powerp × Exam Bottom 10% (β) -0.56
(0.69)
Ho: α=β (p-value) 0.10
Controls No Yes
Cohort & time FE No Yes
Mean 0.37 0.34
person x mon 1456 1199
Cohorts 10 10
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The unit of observation is a civil servant-month. Exam top 10%, bottom 10% are dummy variables that turn on
one for those juniors that are in the top 10%, bottom 10% of their cohort in the recruitment exam respectively. At the
end of training PAS bureaucrats are asked to list their preferred job location from first to fourth most preferred. A
location is preferred if it has ever been categorized as a preferred one by a bureaucrat. Preferred location is a dummy
that turns on 1 whenever a junior is working as a tax collector, in a job location that he or she prefers. Power of
potential seniors (Powerp) is the average rule-based rank, over time, of potential seniors that junior bureaucrats could
have worked with in their first job.
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Appendix B
Data
133
Figure B.1: This figure shows career chart of civil servants. The source of the
data is Services and General Administration Department (S & GAD)
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Figure B.2: Recruitment exam ranking published in newspapers
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Figure B.3: Historical tax records of the central revenue agency i.e. the Board
of Revenue’s (BOR) record room
136
Figure B.4: The BOR tax collection pro forma
Figure B.5: The BOR tax collection pro forma duly verified by District Accounts
Officer
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Figure B.6: An example of an incumbency board: Assistant Commissioner
Multan. This data was digitized to create a tehsil-day level panel of vacancy
and tenure of Assistant Commissioner positions across Punjab. This data when
combined with career charts data identified the set of potential seniors of newly
recruited PAS bureaucrats.
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Appendix C
Details of Complete Data Digitized
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Career charts data on bureaucrats
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Figure C.1: Details of the digitized career charts data
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Table C.1: The table describes details of the career charts data.
Civil Service Group Year No. of Bureaucrats
Total no. of
months observed
in year
Average no. of
months observed
per person
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1956 1 12 12
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1957 1 12 12
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1958 1 12 12
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1959 2 15 8
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1960 2 18 9
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1961 2 24 12
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1962 2 24 12
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1963 4 37 9
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1964 6 62 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1965 12 108 9
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1966 12 112 9
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1967 15 156 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1968 15 170 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1969 16 161 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1970 23 246 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1971 26 263 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1972 30 314 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1973 34 385 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1974 37 402 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1975 46 426 9
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1976 55 572 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1977 64 666 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1978 72 764 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1979 78 835 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1980 87 958 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1981 107 1060 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1982 123 1311 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1983 155 1538 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1984 196 1958 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1985 200 2254 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1986 220 2352 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1987 238 2558 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1988 258 2875 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1989 282 3020 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1990 310 3285 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1991 324 3656 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1992 339 3742 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1993 355 3955 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1994 369 4151 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1995 380 4265 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1996 388 4382 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1997 394 4410 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1998 402 4195 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 1999 361 4048 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2000 363 3968 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2001 348 3758 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2002 340 3683 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2003 334 3762 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2004 343 3862 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2005 340 3806 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2006 326 3616 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2007 327 3589 11
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per person
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2008 361 3705 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2009 337 3691 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2010 329 3554 11
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2011 310 3151 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2012 281 2888 10
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2013 262 1821 7
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2014 72 545 8
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2015 45 200 4
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) 2016 2 6 3
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1950 1 1 1
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1966 1 8 8
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1967 1 12 12
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1968 1 12 12
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1969 1 12 12
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1970 3 36 12
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1971 5 39 8
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1972 10 100 10
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1973 12 127 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1974 24 223 9
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1975 54 620 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1976 50 540 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1977 50 570 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1978 62 666 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1979 53 600 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1980 62 665 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1981 73 791 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1982 73 814 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1983 73 821 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1984 87 857 10
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1985 93 1031 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1986 122 1267 10
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1987 119 1272 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1988 140 1499 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1989 190 1979 10
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1990 186 2053 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1991 187 2087 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1992 232 2170 9
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1993 234 2590 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1994 267 2887 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1995 269 2998 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1996 287 3120 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1997 291 3138 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1998 294 3195 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 1999 348 3497 10
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2000 339 3677 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2001 332 3687 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2002 319 3582 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2003 309 3544 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2004 297 3439 12
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2005 295 3432 12
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2006 289 3347 12
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2007 284 3362 12
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2008 286 3333 12
Continued on next page
142
Table C.1 – continued from previous page
Civil Service Group Year No. of Bureaucrats
Total no. of
months observed
in year
Average no. of
months observed
per person
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2009 284 3289 12
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2010 271 2990 11
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2011 227 1914 8
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2012 87 351 4
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2013 11 113 10
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2014 6 61 10
Provincial Civil Services: Direct Recruits (PCS) 2015 3 4 1
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1971 1 3 3
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1972 2 19 10
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1973 5 46 9
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1974 8 68 9
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1975 10 120 12
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1976 8 96 12
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1977 7 84 12
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1978 28 187 7
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1979 26 285 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1980 45 427 9
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1981 55 612 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1982 71 725 10
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1983 90 959 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1984 90 1015 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1985 100 1080 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1986 101 1148 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1987 102 1172 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1988 104 1212 12
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1989 105 1229 12
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1990 123 1321 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1991 119 1288 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1992 123 1301 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1993 115 1264 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1994 130 1426 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1995 117 1306 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1996 116 1312 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1997 120 1124 9
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1998 128 1261 10
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 1999 148 1527 10
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2000 147 1535 10
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2001 135 1367 10
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2002 114 1288 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2003 106 1173 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2004 106 1162 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2005 93 1039 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2006 89 1007 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2007 87 978 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2008 76 839 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2009 75 802 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2010 75 792 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2011 81 784 10
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2012 73 829 11
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2013 74 760 10
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2014 59 413 7
Provincial Civil Services: Promotees (PCS) 2015 17 63 4
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1969 1 11 11
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Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1970 1 12 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1971 1 12 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1972 1 12 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1973 1 9 9
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1974 1 12 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1975 1 12 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1976 1 12 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1977 2 18 9
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1978 2 24 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1979 3 36 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1980 5 59 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1981 5 59 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1982 8 76 10
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1983 10 118 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1984 10 120 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1985 12 134 11
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1986 27 251 9
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1987 33 339 10
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1988 36 413 11
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1989 40 450 11
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1990 41 479 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1991 44 503 11
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1992 53 544 10
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1993 54 631 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1994 62 719 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1995 63 736 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1996 65 729 11
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1997 64 740 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1998 72 801 11
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 1999 71 850 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2000 72 856 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2001 71 815 11
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2002 73 864 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2003 73 867 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2004 72 860 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2005 72 863 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2006 72 848 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2007 70 833 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2008 70 833 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2009 68 794 12
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2010 64 706 11
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2011 59 378 6
Provincial Secretariat Services (PSS) 2012 10 25 3
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2001 1 10 10
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2002 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2003 2 24 12
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2004 2 24 12
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2005 2 24 12
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2006 58 433 7
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2007 119 807 7
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2008 118 1387 12
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2009 117 1384 12
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2010 184 1975 11
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Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2011 203 2281 11
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2012 197 2285 12
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2013 268 2513 9
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2014 259 1840 7
Provincial Management Services: Direct Recruits (PMS) 2015 78 246 3
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1972 1 1 1
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1973 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1974 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1975 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1976 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1977 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1978 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1979 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1980 1 10 10
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1981 1 2 2
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1982 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1983 1 11 11
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1984 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1987 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1988 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 1989 1 5 5
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2004 1 4 4
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2005 1 12 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2006 5 48 10
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2007 6 62 10
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2008 6 72 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2009 6 61 10
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2010 7 81 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2011 8 81 10
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2012 7 75 11
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2013 7 82 12
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2014 7 43 6
Provincial Management Services: Promotees (PMS) 2015 3 9 3
Ministerial Staff 1980 6 72 12
Ministerial Staff 1981 6 71 12
Ministerial Staff 1982 12 111 9
Ministerial Staff 1983 14 161 12
Ministerial Staff 1984 15 172 11
Ministerial Staff 1985 17 190 11
Ministerial Staff 1986 17 204 12
Ministerial Staff 1987 17 198 12
Ministerial Staff 1988 16 186 12
Ministerial Staff 1989 17 193 11
Ministerial Staff 1990 17 199 12
Ministerial Staff 1991 17 189 11
Ministerial Staff 1992 15 154 10
Ministerial Staff 1993 12 131 11
Ministerial Staff 1994 12 117 10
Ministerial Staff 1995 9 97 11
Ministerial Staff 1996 8 83 10
Ministerial Staff 1997 7 79 11
Ministerial Staff 1998 5 60 12
Ministerial Staff 1999 5 55 11
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Ministerial Staff 2000 6 43 7
Ministerial Staff 2001 6 72 12
Ministerial Staff 2002 5 60 12
Ministerial Staff 2003 5 60 12
Ministerial Staff 2004 4 48 12
Ministerial Staff 2005 4 48 12
Ministerial Staff 2006 10 73 7
Ministerial Staff 2007 9 108 12
Ministerial Staff 2008 9 93 10
Ministerial Staff 2009 7 84 12
Ministerial Staff 2010 7 83 12
Ministerial Staff 2011 7 66 9
Ministerial Staff 2012 6 72 12
Ministerial Staff 2013 6 64 11
Ministerial Staff 2014 5 41 8
Ministerial Staff 2015 3 9 3
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Exam performance data of PAS bureaucrats
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Table C.2: The table describes details of the data on exam performance from Federal
Public Service Commission, Pakistan.
Year of Recruitment
Total no. of bureaucrats
observed in career charts data
(Work in Punjab)
Total no. of bureaucrats
in FPSC exam rank data
(Recruited for Pakistan)
1973 7 13
1974 8 18
1975 6 12
1976 6 10
1977 8 15
1978 7 15
1979 15 24
1980 19 31
1981 17 30
1982 14 22
1983 13 32
1984 15 33
1985 21 24
1986 28 31
1987 16 21
1988 11 16
1989 13 23
1990 18 23
1991 14 17
1992 13 16
1993 8 11
1994 11 18
1995 10 23
1996 12 23
1997 12 19
1998 12 18
1999 13 22
2000 13 20
2002 9 20
2003 9 23
2004 11 25
2005 17 36
2006 15 35
2007 12 35
2008 4 38
2009 15 36
2010 10 37
2011 7 35
2012 13 33
2013 - 36
2014 - 28
2015 - 36
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Tax collection data
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Revenue Circles in Tehsils with Data
(Total tehsils=137, total circles=940)
Figure C.2: Tax circles in tehsils of Punjab with data on tax. Juniors head the
revenue administration in tehsils. Tax performance of juniors is created as an
average of revenue circles in a tehsil.
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Table C.3: The table describes details of the tax data. The data is a monthly unbalanced
panel of revenue circles in tehsils. Where zero revenue circles are mentioned the data is at
a tehsil level. Juniors head the revenue administration in tehsils. Monthly tax performance
of juniors is created as an average of revenue circles in a tehsil.
Details of the Tax Data
District Tehsil Start year End year Total no. of months of data Revenue Circles
Attock Hazro 2001 2012 53 6
Attock Attock 1991 2012 84 8
Attock Pindi Gheb 1991 2012 66 8
Attock Jand 1991 2012 66 6
Attock Hassan Abdal 1992 2012 44 6
Attock Fateh Jang 1991 2012 66 11
Bahawalnagar Fort Abbas 1987 2013 116 7
Bahawalnagar Minchanabad 1987 2013 130 6
Bahawalnagar Haroonabad 1987 2013 118 9
Bahawalnagar Chishtian 1987 2013 129 6
Bahawalnagar Bahawalnagar 1987 2013 116 6
Bahawalpur Khairpur Tamewali 1995 2013 54 8
Bahawalpur Ahmedpur Sharqia 1987 2013 98 4
Bahawalpur Hasilpur 1987 2013 72 2
Bahawalpur Bahawalpur city 1987 2013 82 9
Bahawalpur Yazman 1987 2013 74 4
Bhakkar Mankera 1995 2013 71 8
Bhakkar Kaloorkot 1995 2013 74 8
Bhakkar Darya Khan 2001 2013 56 13
Bhakkar Bhakkar 1995 2013 109 15
Chakwal Kallar Kahar 2004 2013 47 9
Chakwal Chakwal 1988 2013 119 15
Chakwal Choa Saidan Shah 1991 2013 88 5
Chakwal Talagang 1988 2013 112 11
Chiniot Lalian 2009 2013 26 9
Chiniot Bhohana 2009 2013 26 5
Chiniot Chiniot 1987 2013 70 13
Dera Ghazi Khan Dera Ghazi Khan 1995 2013 79 6
Dera Ghazi Khan Taunsa Sharif 1998 2013 49 6
Faisalabad Jaranwala 1984 2013 128 11
Faisalabad Faisalabad Saddar 1984 2013 142 25
Faisalabad Chak Jhumra 1991 2013 130 9
Faisalabad Tandlianwala 2002 2013 90 5
Faisalabad Samundri 1984 2013 127 7
Faisalabad Faisalabad City 1995 2013 85 3
Gujranwala Kamoki 1991 2013 111 4
Gujranwala Nowshera Virkan 1991 2013 114 4
Gujranwala Gujranwala City 1991 2013 118 4
Gujranwala Wazirabad 1991 2013 113 6
Gujranwala Gujranwala Saddar 1995 2012 81 0
Gujrat Sarai Alamgir 2001 2013 82 0
Gujrat Kharian 2001 2013 88 0
Gujrat Gujrat 1994 2013 118 8
Hafizabad Pindi Bhattian 1994 2013 104 12
Hafizabad Hafizabad 1991 2013 115 7
Jhang Shorkot 1987 2012 73 4
Jhang 18 Hazari 2010 2013 35 4
Jhang Ahmed Pur Sial 2005 2012 31 4
Jhang Jhang 1987 2013 85 18
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Jhelum Dina 2008 2013 47 1
Jhelum Pind Dadan Khan 1987 2013 99 4
Jhelum Sohawa 1991 2003 38 4
Jhelum Jhelum 1987 2013 125 5
Kasur Kasur 1987 2013 179 11
Kasur Chunian 1987 2013 179 13
Kasur Pattoki 1995 2013 145 7
Kasur Kot Rada Kishan 2006 2013 73 4
Khanewal Jahanian 1991 2013 150 4
Khanewal Khanewal 1987 2013 173 9
Khanewal Kabirwala 1987 2013 166 6
Khanewal Mian Channu 1987 2013 167 10
Khushab Khushab 1987 2013 117 4
Khushab Noorpur Thal 1987 2013 117 7
Khushab Quaidabad 2007 2013 54 3
Lahore Lahore Nishtar Town 1997 2011 48 9
Lahore Lahore Saddar 1987 2012 121 2
Lahore Lahore Modeltown 1997 2012 35 1
Lahore Lahore City 1987 2012 125 1
Lahore Lahore Shalimar 1997 2012 49 4
Layyah towns Layyah 1987 2013 100 9
Layyah towns Fatehpur 1987 2013 94 4
Layyah towns Chaubara 1987 2013 94 5
Lodhran Lodhran 1987 2013 107 0
Lodhran Dunya Pur 2001 2013 64 4
Lodhran Kahror Pacca 2001 2013 63 3
Mandi Bahauddin Mandi Bahauddin 1995 2013 77 13
Mandi Bahauddin Phalia 1995 2013 74 8
Mandi Bahauddin Malakwal 1995 2013 75 4
Mianwali Isakhel 1987 2013 107 13
Mianwali Piplan 1995 2013 103 11
Mianwali Mianwali 1987 2013 130 12
Multan Jalalpur Pirwala 1991 2013 142 8
Multan Shujabad 1987 2013 169 10
Multan Multan 1987 2013 173 22
Multan Multan Saddar 1991 2013 154 14
Muzaffargarh Kot Addu 1987 2013 155 9
Muzaffargarh Jatoi 1997 2013 112 11
Muzaffargarh Alipur 1987 2013 156 11
Muzaffargarh Muzaffargarh 1987 2013 168 5
Nankana Sahib Nankana Sahib 1995 2013 97 11
Nankana Sahib Shahkot 2006 2013 42 3
Nankana Sahib Sangla Hill 2003 2013 42 3
Narowal Zaffarwal 2009 2013 22 3
Narowal Shakargarh 1987 2013 140 13
Narowal Narowal 1987 2013 143 16
Okara Depalpur 1983 2012 87 3
Okara Okara 1983 2012 109 7
Okara Renala khurd 1999 2012 80 2
Pakpattan Arifwala 1987 2013 104 1
Pakpattan Pakpattan 1987 2013 103 10
Rahim Yar Khan Liaquatpur 1996 2012 42 3
Rahim Yar Khan Rahim Yar Khan 1984 2012 47 6
Rahim Yar Khan Khanpur 1984 2012 43 1
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Rahim Yar Khan Sadiqabad 1984 2012 42 7
Rajanpur Jampur 1987 2013 114 7
Rajanpur Rojhan 1987 2013 114 6
Rajanpur Rajanpur 1987 2013 131 6
Rawalpindi Kotli Sattian 1991 2006 19 0
Rawalpindi Gujar Khan 1987 2006 38 0
Rawalpindi Kallar Syedan 2004 2006 5 0
Rawalpindi Murree 1987 2006 37 0
Rawalpindi Rawalpindi City 1987 2006 38 0
Rawalpindi Taxila 1989 2006 23 0
Rawalpindi Kahuta 1987 2006 38 0
Sahiwal Sahiwal 1995 2013 70 8
Sahiwal Chichawatni 1995 2013 69 7
Sargodha Sillanwali 1995 2013 60 3
Sargodha Kotmomin 2007 2013 46 5
Sargodha Sahiwal 1995 2013 78 17
Sargodha Sargodha 1987 2013 85 9
Sargodha Shahpur 1987 2013 90 4
Sargodha Bhalwal 1987 2013 90 10
Sheikhupura Ferozewala 1995 2013 85 16
Sheikhupura Safdarabad 1998 2013 97 7
Sheikhupura Sheikhupura 1995 2013 86 16
Sheikhupura Muridke 1997 2013 56 8
Sheikhupura Sharaqpur 2006 2013 50 3
Sialkot Sialkot 1987 2013 75 7
Sialkot Sambrial 2012 2013 12 0
Sialkot Pasrur 1987 2013 58 7
Sialkot Daska 1987 2013 58 2
Toba Tek Singh Gojra 1994 2012 77 7
Toba Tek Singh Toba Tek Singh 1995 2012 75 9
Toba Tek Singh Kamalia 1994 2012 78 5
Vehari Vehari 1991 2013 81 11
Vehari Mailsi 1991 2012 79 7
Vehari Burewala Mailsi 1991 2013 106 15
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Vacancy and tenure of Assistant Commissioner positions
across Punjab: incumbency board data
Table C.4: The table describes details of the incumbency board data on vacancy and
tenure of Assistant Commissioner (tax collector) positions across Punjab
District Tehsil Start year End year
Total no. of
years observed
Average no. of
days per year
observed
Attock Attock 1970 2013 44 360
Attock Fateh Jang 1988 2016 29 347
Attock Hassan Abdal 2001 2015 15 329
Attock Hazro 2004 2013 10 306
Attock Jand 1985 2013 29 354
Attock Pindi Gheb 1971 2013 43 363
Bahawalnagar Bahawalnagar 1973 2015 43 362
Bahawalnagar Chishtian 1961 2014 54 365
Bahawalnagar Fort Abbas 1972 2012 36 346
Bahawalnagar Haroonabad 1991 2014 24 361
Bahawalnagar Minchanabad 1972 2014 43 362
Bahawalpur Ahmedpur Sharqia 1979 2015 37 351
Bahawalpur Bahawalpur city 2011 2014 4 293
Bahawalpur Bahwalpur Sadar 2005 2013 9 323
Bahawalpur Hasilpur 1972 2013 42 365
Bahawalpur Khairpur Tamewali 1990 2014 25 363
Bahawalpur Yazman 2011 2015 5 277
Bhakkar Bhakkar 1982 2014 33 359
Bhakkar Darya Khan 2003 2014 12 330
Bhakkar Kaloorkot 1982 2015 34 355
Bhakkar Mankera 1982 2015 34 356
Chakwal Chakwal 1947 2014 68 365
Chakwal Choa Saidan Shah 2010 2014 5 332
Chakwal Kallar Kahar 2005 2015 11 326
Chakwal Talagang 1971 2013 43 358
Chiniot Bhohana 2009 2014 6 308
Chiniot Chiniot 1966 2015 50 360
Chiniot Lalian 2009 2015 7 304
Dera Ghazi Khan Dera Ghazi Khan 1970 2015 46 355
Dera Ghazi Khan Taunsa Sharif 1964 2014 51 363
Faisalabad Chak Jhumra 2001 2015 15 339
Faisalabad Faisalabad City 1987 2015 29 359
Faisalabad Faisalabad Saddar 1971 2014 44 362
Faisalabad Jaranwala 1970 2014 45 361
Faisalabad Samundri 1970 2015 46 357
Faisalabad Tandlianwala 1994 2015 22 347
Gujranwala Gujranwala City 1999 2014 16 332
Gujranwala Gujranwala Saddar 1970 2014 45 359
Gujranwala Kamoki 1970 2015 46 358
Gujranwala Nowshera Virkan 1995 2015 21 338
Gujranwala Wazirabad 1963 2015 53 360
Gujrat Gujrat 1974 2015 42 363
Gujrat Kharian 1989 2015 27 359
Gujrat Sarai Alamgir 1996 2014 19 365
Hafizabad Hafizabad 1970 2013 44 357
Hafizabad Pindi Bhattian 1993 2014 22 359
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Jhang 18 Hazari 2010 2014 5 310
Jhang Ahmed Pur Sial 2003 2013 11 319
Jhang Jhang 1971 2013 43 358
Jhang Shorkot 1970 2015 46 357
Jhelum Dina 2004 2014 11 346
Jhelum Jhelum 2001 2014 14 361
Jhelum Pind Dadan Khan 1947 2013 67 358
Jhelum Sohawa 1985 2014 30 356
Kasur Chunian 1970 2011 42 359
Kasur Kasur 2001 2014 14 337
Kasur Kot Rada Kishan 2006 2013 8 336
Kasur Pattoki 1992 2013 22 345
Khanewal Jahanian 2001 2014 14 346
Khanewal Kabirwala 1975 2014 40 361
Khanewal Khanewal 1947 2014 68 358
Khanewal Mian Channu 1985 2013 29 359
Khushab Jauharabad 1947 2014 68 364
Khushab Noorpur Thal 1982 2015 34 355
Khushab Quaidabad 2009 2013 5 339
Lahore Lahore City 1993 2014 22 353
Lahore Lahore Modeltown 1982 2014 24 357
Lahore Lahore Nishtar Town 2001 2014 14 330
Lahore Lahore Saddar 1982 2015 34 363
Lahore Lahore Shalimar 2011 2014 4 307
Layyah towns Fatehpur 1982 2014 33 358
Layyah towns Layyah 1981 2014 34 357
Lodhran Dunya Pur 1991 2013 23 352
Lodhran Kahror Pacca 1991 2013 23 351
Lodhran Lodhran 1963 2014 52 363
Mandi Bahauddin Malakwal 1993 2013 21 353
Mandi Bahauddin Mandi Bahauddin 1963 2015 53 357
Mandi Bahauddin Phalia 1993 2014 22 351
Mianwali Isakhel 1971 2015 45 357
Mianwali Mianwali 1970 2015 46 357
Mianwali Piplan 1993 2015 23 355
Multan Jalalpur Pirwala 1991 2015 25 355
Multan Multan 1989 2014 26 361
Multan Multan Saddar 1977 2015 39 353
Multan Shujabad 1989 2015 27 348
Muzaffargarh Alipur 1964 2015 52 355
Muzaffargarh Jatoi 1996 2015 20 338
Muzaffargarh Kot Addu 2012 2014 3 289
Muzaffargarh Muzaffargarh 2001 2015 15 331
Nankana Sahib Sangla Hill 2005 2014 10 345
Nankana Sahib Shahkot 2006 2014 9 312
Narowal Narowal 1950 2013 64 361
Narowal Shakargarh 1970 2015 46 359
Narowal Zaffarwal 2009 2013 5 277
Okara Depalpur 1970 2015 46 362
Okara Okara 1963 2013 51 362
Okara Renala khurd 2002 2015 14 351
Pakpattan Arifwala 1987 2015 29 351
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Pakpattan Pakpattan 1947 2014 68 361
Rahim Yar Khan Khanpur 1979 2013 35 349
Rahim Yar Khan Liaquatpur 1971 2001 31 350
Rahim Yar Khan Rahim Yar Khan 1978 2013 36 352
Rahim Yar Khan Sadiqabad 2001 2014 14 349
Rajanpur Jampur 2001 2011 11 329
Rajanpur Rajanpur 1968 2001 34 352
Rajanpur Rojhan 1982 2013 32 356
Rawalpindi Gujar Khan 1963 2014 52 362
Rawalpindi Kahuta 1972 2013 42 352
Rawalpindi Kallar Syedan 2004 2014 11 335
Rawalpindi Kotli Sattian 1990 2014 25 346
Rawalpindi Murree 1947 2013 67 364
Rawalpindi Rawalpindi City 1982 2013 22 351
Rawalpindi Taxila 1988 2013 26 349
Sahiwal Chichawatni 1980 2014 35 358
Sahiwal Sahiwal 1972 2014 43 360
Sargodha Bhalwal 1972 2015 44 356
Sargodha Kotmomin 2003 2014 12 339
Sargodha Sahiwal 1994 2015 22 333
Sargodha Sargodha 1974 2013 40 360
Sargodha Shahpur 1975 2014 40 363
Sargodha Sillanwali 1996 2013 18 363
Sheikhupura Ferozewala 1963 2015 53 360
Sheikhupura Muridke 2006 2014 9 342
Sheikhupura Safdarabad 2001 2015 15 351
Sheikhupura Sharaqpur 2006 2015 10 323
Sheikhupura Sheikhupura 1970 2015 46 361
Sialkot Daska 1963 2015 53 365
Sialkot Pasrur 1970 2013 44 361
Sialkot Sambrial 2005 2015 11 314
Sialkot Sialkot 1972 2015 44 357
Toba Tek Singh Gojra 1982 2013 32 355
Toba Tek Singh Kamalia 1982 2015 34 355
Toba Tek Singh Toba Tek Singh 1949 2014 66 364
Vehari Burewala Mailsi 1976 2013 38 356
Vehari Vehari 2003 2014 12 337
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